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Articles
FEDERALISM AND THE RIGHT TO DECIDE WHO DECIDES
ANDREW B. AYERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE that a state amends its constitution to create a new state of-ficer who is empowered to choose, for any given issue, which other state
officer will make decisions on that issue.  This new officer, in other words,
will choose which other state officer will exercise the power of the sover-
eign in a given field.  Mimicking names like Attorney General, Inspector
General, and Solicitor General, the amendment calls this officer the Dele-
gator General.  The Delegator General has no power to order any citizen
to do anything, or to issue a ruling on any particular issue.  This officer’s
power is exclusively procedural; the Delegator General decides who
decides.
Now imagine that the United States Congress passes a statute which
requires that the state’s Delegator General assign certain decisions—say,
about immigration or guns—to one branch of the state government,
rather than another.  Would this statute violate the state’s sovereignty?
Federal statutes already in existence accomplish essentially what this
fictional statute would: they compel state governments to assign decisions
on specific issues to one branch or entity within state government, rather
than any other.  This paper explores the argument that commandeering
the state’s delegation function violates state sovereignty, just as comman-
deering the state legislature or executive-branch officials does.
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Although there is no such thing as a Delegator General, all states do
have ways of deciding who gets to exercise the power of the sovereign on
which issue.  Rather than allowing an individual to make such decisions,
the power to delegate is distributed.  Sometimes the state constitution del-
egates power; courts interpret constitutions in ways that result in further
specification of power; statutes make further assignments; governors and
their designees delegate power down their chains of command; and so on.
The delegation function may never be consolidated in a single office (per-
haps for good reason), but it is a real function.
And in several controversial areas of law, including immigration and
gun-seller liability, the federal government has created statutes that effec-
tively commandeer states’ Delegators General.  Instead of saying states can
or cannot take action, these federal statutes allow states to act, but only if
they do it by legislative enactment—not through executive order, agency
regulation, judicial decision, or any other form of state action.  The theory
I want to evaluate here is that state sovereignty precludes the federal gov-
ernment from conditioning states’ authority on the states’ use of one par-
ticular branch of their government.
The first section of the article explains how these statutes work, and
gives enough examples to show that the problem (if indeed it is a prob-
lem) is widespread.  The second section explains how these federal stat-
utes co-opt the states’ delegation function: they preempt action by any
state entity other than the legislature.  This is a form of conditional pre-
emption, in that the states are preempted unless their legislature acts.
As the third section of the article explains, the Supreme Court has
upheld conditional preemption in a variety of contexts.  But there should
be an exception to that principle for statutes that leave only one compo-
nent of the state government with the power to act.  The third section of
the article makes the case for a rule against conditioning preemption on
the state’s choice to act through a specified branch of its government.
Conditional preemption of this kind is analogous to commandeering one
of the state’s officials.
II. USING PREEMPTION TO PUSH DECISIONS INTO STATE LEGISLATURES
Several federal statutes use preemption to push specific policy choices
into state legislatures.  This section analyzes two of those statutes, explain-
ing how they use preemption to control states’ choices about which
branch of state government (or entity within state government) is empow-
ered to exercise the state’s sovereign power on a given issue.  It then gives
examples of other statutes that do the same thing, to show that the prob-
lem (if indeed it is a problem) is widespread.  Finally, it shows that many
other federal statutes give states decision-making power in federally-domi-
nated areas of law without limiting the states’ ability to choose their own
decision-makers.
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A. The Commerce-in-Arms Act
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act preempts any civil
action for damages “resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse” of a
firearm.1  But it exempts from preemption a civil action that alleges know-
ing violations of a federal or state statute.2  So there is no preemption if the
state authorizes a civil action against gun sellers by statute; but preemption
will apply if the state authorizes the civil action through its judicial com-
mon law.
The Commerce-in-Arms Act has been applied to preempt actions by
the victims of gun violence against stores that negligently sell firearms to
dangerous people.  For example, in 2012, the manager of the Odessa
Pawn & Gun Shop in Odessa, Missouri, sold a gun to Colby Weathers, even
though Colby’s mother had called two days earlier to warn the manager
that Colby was severely mentally ill and had tried to kill herself with a gun
he had sold her the previous month.3  After he sold Colby the gun, she
went directly home and used it to kill her father.4  Colby’s now-widowed
mother, Janet Delana, who had begged the manager not to sell Colby the
gun, filed a negligence action against Odessa Gun & Pawn.  But the Mis-
souri Supreme Court found that her lawsuit was—in most respects—pre-
empted by the Commerce-in-Arms Act.5  The Act “expressly preempts all
civil actions seeking damages against sellers resulting from the criminal or
unlawful misuse of a firearm,” and Janet Delana was suing for damages
1. Here’s how the Commerce-in-Arms Act works.  First, it says that “[a] quali-
fied civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court.”  15
U.S.C. § 7902(a) (2018).  Then, the Act defines a “qualified civil liability action” as
“a civil action . . . brought by any person against a . . . seller of a qualified product
. . . for damages . . . resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified
product by the person or a third party.”  15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A).  A “qualified
product” includes firearms and ammunition.  15 U.S.C. § 7903(4).
All qualified civil liability actions “shall be immediately dismissed by the court
in which the action was brought or is currently pending.”  15 U.S.C. § 7902(b).
Courts have divided on whether the Commerce-in-Arms Act preempts specific
causes of action—potentially allowing other causes of action in a specific case to go
forward—or whether it applies to entire cases. See Ramos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
202 F. Supp. 3d 457, 465–66 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (listing cases).
2. Excluded from the definition of a “qualified civil liability action” are ac-
tions for knowing violations of state or federal statutes related to firearms.  15
U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).  Also exempted from preemption are actions for negli-
gence per se and negligent entrustment.  15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii).
3. Delana v. CED Sales, 486 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Mo. 2016) (en banc); see also
Ann E. Marimow, A Warning, a Gun Sale and Tragic Consequences, WASH. POST (Mar.
6, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2017/03/06/despite-a-mo
thers-plea-her-mentally-ill-daughter-was-sold-a-gun-with-tragic-results/?utm_term=
.846b57db9f39 [https://perma.cc/FD2Q-CSX8].  The business’s name is listed in
the case caption as “Odessa Pawn & Gun,” but “Odessa Gun & Pawn” appears to be
the name under which it does business. See https://www.facebook.com/Odessagun
andpawn/ [https://perma.cc/GBT5-UM59 ] (last visited June 20, 2017).
4. See Delana, 486 S.W. at 319; Marimow, supra note 3.
5. See Delana, 486 S.W.3d at 321–22.
3
Ayers: Federalism and the Right to Decide Who Decides
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
570 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 567
that resulted from Colby’s unlawful misuse of the firearms that Odessa
Gun & Pawn had sold.6
Delana argued that the Commerce-in-Arms Act violated Missouri’s
sovereignty by “dictating to Missouri how it must delegate its lawmaking
function among its governmental branches.”7  Congress had used preemp-
tion to wipe away judicially made law on gun-shop liability, leaving the
state legislature as the only state body capable of making law on such is-
sues.  But the Missouri Supreme Court rejected her state-sovereignty argu-
ment, explaining briefly that the Act “does not commandeer the executive
or legislative branch of Missouri government.”8
That wasn’t the end of Delana’s lawsuit; under a separate exception to
the Act, the court allowed Delana to proceed with a negligent-entrustment
claim,9 and the gun shop settled the case for $2.2 million.10  But the
court’s decision stands for the principle that Congress can use preemption
to push decisions into states’ legislatures.
The Second Circuit endorsed the same principle when the City of
New York filed a public-nuisance action against gun manufacturers and
sellers in an effort to curb gun violence.11  The plaintiffs argued that the
Commerce-in-Arms Act “violates the Tenth Amendment by dictating
which branch of states’ governments may authoritatively pronounce state
law.”12  The problem was that the federal law exempts from preemption
lawsuits brought under state statutes, but not lawsuits brought under state
common law: The Act recognizes “predicate exceptions defined by statute,
i.e. by a state’s legislative branch, but not by common law as interpreted by
state courts.”13
The Second Circuit rejected the argument succinctly, holding that
the Act “does not commandeer any branch of state government because it
imposes no affirmative duty of any kind on any of them.”14  Judges Miner
and Cabranes evidently believed that commandeering challenges can suc-
ceed only if a specific branch of the state government is commandeered.
6. Id. at 321.  Delana’s lawsuit was preempted because it was “a civil action . . .
brought by any person against a . . . seller of a [firearm] . . . for damages . . .
resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the per-
son or a third party.”  15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A).  Weathers’s plea—not guilty by rea-
son of mental disease or defect—established that her conduct was criminal (she
was committed to a secure treatment institution, even though she couldn’t be pun-
ished). Delana, 486 S.W.3d at 321.
7. Delana, 486 S.W.3d at 323 (quoting brief).
8. Id. at 323–24.
9. The Missouri Court allowed Delana’s claim for negligent entrustment to go
forward under a separate exception to the federal statute. Id. at 326.
10. See Marimow, supra note 3.
11. See City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008).
12. Id. at 392.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 397.  Judge Katzmann, in dissent, would have avoided the constitu-
tional question. Id. at 405 (Katzmann, J., dissenting).
4
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Like the Missouri Supreme Court, the Second Circuit allows Congress to
push decisions into state legislatures.
B. The Immigration-Benefits Bar
In 1996, Congress passed a public-benefits statute known as the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, often
called the Welfare Reform Act or, tongue-tanglingly, “PRWORA.”15  It
contained a provision which I’ll call “the Immigration-Benefits Bar,” codi-
fied at 8 U.S.C. § 1621, which prohibits state governments from giving
public benefits to certain noncitizens.
The Benefits Bar says that states can give public benefits only to enu-
merated categories of noncitizens.16  The enumerated categories include
all “qualified aliens,”17 i.e., those eligible for federal public benefits: lawful
permanent residents, asylees, refugees, and noncitizens in several humani-
tarian statuses.18  The Benefits Bar also allows state public benefits for
nonimmigrants,19 a group that includes people on student visas, tempo-
rary workers, and many other categories of temporarily present
noncitizens.20
But the Benefits Bar does not exempt, and thus bars benefits for,
some significant categories of noncitizens, among them people in Tempo-
rary Protected Status.21  It also doesn’t exempt people with no authoriza-
tion to be present (“undocumented immigrants”22), or those who are
present because immigration authorities have exercised prosecutorial dis-
cretion and granted them “deferred action”23 (including beneficiaries of
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program24).  So un-
15. See Pub. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (Aug. 22, 1996).
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2018).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a)(1), referring to the definition of “qualified alien” in 8
U.S.C. § 1641.
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1641.  Section 1621(a) adds another humanitarian category,
aliens paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) for less than one year.
19. Id. § 1621(a).
20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).
21. On temporary protected status, see 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(B).
22. See generally Kari Hong, The Ten Parts of “Illegal” in “Illegal Immigration” That
I Do Not Understand, 50 UC DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 43 (2017).
23. See generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE
OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES (2015).
24. On DACA, see Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discre-
tion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV.
DISC. 58 (2015); on DACA’s rescission, see https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/
05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/ZB7A-WGBS].  Currently,
the DACA program continues in effect because of two nationwide preliminary in-
junctions that compel the federal government to continue it. See Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1049 (N.D. Cal.
2018); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 438 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).  As of
March 25, 2018 (the date of finalizing this article), litigation in both cases is
ongoing.
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documented people and beneficiaries of deferred action cannot receive
state public benefits unless some other exception to the Benefits Bar
applies.
The Benefits Bar has an important exception under which a state can
offer public benefits if it does so “through the enactment of a State law
after August 22, 1996 which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”25
In other words, states can offer public benefits to otherwise-ineligible
noncitizens if they do so by passing legislation.26  The most straightfor-
ward reading of § 1621(d)’s state-law override provision is that only a stat-
ute passed by the legislature can trigger the override.27
The Benefits Bar and the state-law override together function to give
states a choice whether to offer public benefits to significant categories of
noncitizens.  There are serious constitutional questions about the permis-
sibility of this arrangement, because state choices affecting noncitizens are
constitutionally suspect.  In general, state decisions that deny public bene-
fits on the basis of immigration status are subject to strict scrutiny.28  To be
sure, Equal Protection jurisprudence allows the federal government to treat
noncitizens differently, subjecting its decisions only to rational-basis scru-
tiny; but, as Michael Wishnie observes, there are powerful reasons to be-
lieve that the federal government cannot share its power to discriminate
with the states.29  This article maps out a state-sovereignty challenge to the
Welfare Reform Act, but it is important to be aware of the Act’s other
vulnerabilities.
The Benefits Bar became the subject of litigation in several states
when state courts received applications for bar admission from otherwise-
qualified noncitizens who were either undocumented or beneficiaries of
the DACA program.30  On its face, § 1621(d) appeared not to help the
25. “A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien
would otherwise be ineligible under [the benefits bar] only through the enact-
ment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such
eligibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).
26. For an example of a state taking advantage of the override provision, see
Kaider v. Hamos, 975 N.E.2d 667, 669–70; 679–80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2012),
which discusses a state law that allows health-care benefits for undocumented preg-
nant women and children, and rejects a preemption challenge to that aspect of the
“Moms & Babies” program.
27. The legislative history of § 1621(d) supports this reading: “Only the af-
firmative enactment of a law by a State legislature and signed by the Governor after the
date of enactment of this Act, that references this provision, will meet the require-
ments of this section.”  H.R. Rep. No. 104-725, at 383 (1996) (emphasis added).
But see Martinez v. Regents of U. of Cal., 50 Cal. 4th 1277, 1293 (2010) (noting that
a similar statement in the legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1623 is merely a “general
summary [that] oversimplifies more nuanced statutory language”).
28. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
29. Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 530 (2001).
30. See Florida Bd. of Bar Exam’rs Re: Question As To Whether Undocu-
mented Immigrants Are Eligible For Admission To The Florida Bar, 134 So. 3d
6
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applicants in California, Florida and New York, because those states had
no statute affirmatively providing for the benefits at issue.31
The litigation gave rise to various complex questions of statutory in-
terpretation.  Some litigants argued, unsuccessfully, that DACA benefi-
ciaries are “qualified aliens” exempt from the Benefits Bar.32  Some
argued, again unsuccessfully, that attorney licensure is not among the
kinds of “public benefit” prohibited by the Benefits Bar.33  And an impor-
432 (Fla. Mar. 6, 2014); In re Garcia, 58 Cal. 4th 440 (2014); Matter of Vargas, 131
A.D.3d 4, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015).
31. New York State has Judiciary Law § 460, which precludes consideration of
immigration status in decisions about bar admission, but section 460 was enacted
before 1996, see 1982 Sess. Laws of NY ch. 133 § 29, so it doesn’t trigger the state-
law override.
32. It’s hard to argue that DACA beneficiaries are “qualified aliens” exempt
from the bar under § 1621(a)(1).  Section 1621 refers to the definition of “quali-
fied alien” in 8 U.S.C. § 1641, which in turn defines “qualified alien” to include
several groups to which DACA beneficiaries plainly do not belong: legal perma-
nent residents, asylees, and refugees.
Section 1641 also includes “an alien whose deportation is being withheld under
section 243(h) of such Act [8 U.S.C. 1253] (as in effect immediately before the effec-
tive date of section 307 of division C of Public Law 104-208) or § 241(b)(3) of such
Act ([8 USC § 1251(b)(3)] (as amended by section 305(a) of division C of Public
Law 104-208).”  8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(5) (emphasis added).  But neither of these ap-
ply to DACA beneficiaries.  Relief under § 243(h) became unavailable in 1997,
when § 243(h) was removed from the law; the current § 243 contains no subsec-
tion (h). See P.L. 104-208, div. C § 307 (1997); INA § 243, codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253.  And relief under § 241(b)(3) is a special category of relief from removal
for people who can show that their “life or freedom would be threatened in the
proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.16.
Nor are DACA beneficiaries “nonimmigrants” exempt under § 1621(a)(2), or
parolees exempt under § 1621(a)(3).
33. Section 1621(c) defines “state or local public benefit” to include “any
grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an
agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local
government. . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A).  Licensure as an attorney, also known
as bar admission, is a “professional license” under any reasonable interpretation of
that phrase.  Certificates of admission in New York, for example, have the word
“license” in their text. See, e.g., Certificate of Bar Admission for Andrew B. Ayers,
on file with author.
Some litigants argued that the Bar does not apply to attorney licenses because
§ 1621’s text refers to public benefits that are “provided by an agency of a State or
local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government.” Id. (em-
phasis added).  A state court is not an “agency of a State . . . government.”  As
DOJ’s California brief conceded, “the customary use of that term [agency] in fed-
eral statutes does not encompass the judicial branch.”  US Br. to Cal. at 7. See
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 699 (1995) (“In ordinary parlance, federal
courts are not described as ‘departments’ or ‘agencies’ of the Government. . . .
[I]t would be strange indeed to refer to a court as an ‘agency.’”).  DOJ also notes
that other parts of PRWORA (the Act of which § 1621 is a part) make explicit that
they cover state courts and state agencies, while § 1621 doesn’t do so. See DOJ Br.
to Cal. at 8 n.2, citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(i)(ii) and other provisions.
But attorney licenses nonetheless appear to fall within § 1621(c)’s definition
of public benefits, because they are “provided . . . by appropriated funds of a
State.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A).  DOJ argued in the California case that state
7
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tant but puzzling question is presented by the language of § 1621(d), the
override provision, which seems to allow states to extend public benefits
only to unlawfully present aliens—not to those in lawful statuses like Tem-
porary Protected Status who are otherwise excluded from benefits under
the Benefits Bar.34  Congress cannot have intended to allow states to give
benefits to unlawfully present people, while excluding lawfully present
beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status, and indeed New York has
concluded that the override provision allows benefits for both.35  But we
can skip over these questions here because they aren’t relevant to state
courts operate using funds appropriated by the state legislature (DOJ Br. to Cal. at
9), and the Florida Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: Florida courts
operate with appropriated funds, so attorney licenses are covered by the benefits
bar (Fl. S. Ct. slip op. at 5).
The California board of bar examiners, and Garcia, argued that attorney li-
censure is not “provided . . . by appropriated funds of a State” because the use of
appropriated funds is de minimis, and because no funds were set aside specifically
for bar admissions. Similarly, a LatinoJustice report argues that attorney licenses
are not “provided . . . by appropriated funds,” because “bar admissions are entirely
financed by private funds.”  Funds for the bar committees that review applications
are “paid by lawyer dues, not state appropriations.” See LatinoJustice, Lifting the
Bar: Undocumented Law Graduates & Access to Law Licenses 15–17 (Feb. 21, 2014),
available at http://prbany.com/lifting-the-bar-undocumented-law-graduates-access
-to-law-licenses/ [https://perma.cc/WZ2T-MV76].  Although judges’ salaries are
of course paid from appropriated funds, LatinoJustice argues that those salaries
are “not specifically designated for any purpose,” and “the word ‘appropriated’
means to set apart for or assign to a particular purpose or use.” Id.  These argu-
ments are developed in a report by LatinoJustice and other groups. Id.  For a
similar argument, see Katherine Tianyue Qu, Current Developments 2012-2013: Pass-
ing the Legal Bar: State Courts and the Licensure of Undocumented Immigrants, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 959, 963–64 (2013).
These arguments are unlikely to prevail.  The text of § 1621 contains no de
minimis exception, and courts are likely to embrace—or defer to—DOJ’s position
that attorney licenses are provided with appropriated funds.  Also, New York State
law considers funds to be “appropriated” even if they are fees collected from appli-
cants to pay for the costs of processing applications (that is, even if a program pays
for itself and the legislature doesn’t need to set aside specific funds for it).  Thus,
it’s likely that attorney licensure is the kind of “public benefit” to which the bene-
fits bar applies.
34. The text of the statute is quite clear on this point.  The title of § 1621(d)
is “State Authority to Provide for Eligibility of Illegal Aliens for State and Local Pub-
lic Benefits.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (emphasis added).  And its text says “[a] State
may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is eligible
for any State or local public benefit” by legislative enactment. Id. (emphasis
added).
35. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute “obviously” autho-
rizes benefits for lawfully present noncitizens.  Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418,
426 (2001).  The court noted that [s]ection 1621(d) refers to “[s]tate authority to
provide for eligibility of illegal aliens” (emphasis added), but held that “the statute
obviously authorizes the State to provide State Medicaid to PRUCOLs.” Id. at 429
n.9.  The term “PRUCOLs” here refers to people “permanently residing in the
United States under color of law”—a term which the Court of Appeals had defined
to include “aliens of whom the INS is aware, but has no plans to deport.” Id. at 422
n.2.  Because the plaintiffs in that case included “PRUCOLs,” this portion of the
opinion was holding, not dicta.
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss4/1
2018] RIGHT TO DECIDE WHO DECIDES 575
sovereignty; suffice to say that courts have found no statutory argument
under which unauthorized aliens or DACA beneficiaries may receive state
public benefits without a state legislative enactment.
The Florida Supreme Court held that unauthorized aliens and DACA
beneficiaries are ineligible for bar admission because of the Benefits
Bar.36  But Florida then enacted a statute allowing undocumented aliens
to be licensed as lawyers,37 which triggers the override provision and elimi-
nates any need to rule on its lawfulness.  In California, before the Supreme
Court could rule on the question of an undocumented lawyer’s eligibility
for licensure, the state legislature passed a special statute which triggered
the state-law override, and so the candidate was licensed without any judi-
cial ruling on the applicability of the Benefits Bar.38  And in Missouri, a
DACA beneficiary was denied licensure as a nurse because although Mis-
souri had taken up the override provision’s invitation to offer public bene-
fits to otherwise-ineligible noncitizens, the Missouri statute chose not to
offer them professional licenses.39  In none of these cases did any party
discuss the kind of state-sovereignty argument that is the subject of this
article.40
When a state-sovereignty argument was raised on behalf of Cesar Var-
gas, a DACA beneficiary seeking bar admission in New York, the Second
Department of the state’s Appellate Division adopted the theory rejected
in the Commerce-in-Arms cases discussed above: that Congress violates
state sovereignty when it uses preemption to push states to act through
their legislatures.41
Vargas, and the New York Attorney General’s office in an amicus
brief, urged the Appellate Division to invoke the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance and construe section 1621’s term “enactment of a state law” to
36. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 134 So. 3d 432 (Fla. Mar. 6, 2014).
37. H.R. 755, § 454.021, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); see Wendi Adelson,
Lawfully Present Lawyers, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 387, 399 (2015).
38. In re Garcia, 58 Cal. 4th 440 (2014).  All of the submissions to the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Garcia can be found at http://www.courts.ca.gov/18822.htm
[https://perma.cc/R79F-6SRA].
39. MO. REV. STAT. § 208.009.  Because the state law did not make profes-
sional licenses available to those noncitizens, a case in Missouri involving a nurse’s
application for licensure was resolved without discussion of the Benefits Bar’s law-
fulness.  The Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, evaluating a nurse’s
application for licensure, held that a Missouri law that listed specific benefits avail-
able for noncitizens did not mention professional licensure. See Zamarron v. State
Bd. of Nursing, 2017 Mo. Admin. Hearings LEXIS 1530 (May 2, 2017) (discussing
MO. REV. STAT. § 208.009).
40. The applicant in Garcia did argue that the Benefits Bar violated state sov-
ereignty by compelling the states to participate in the enforcement of immigration
law. Garcia, Applicant’s Opening Brief at 15–18, available at http://
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2-s202512-pet-opening-brief-merits-061812.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3DF-XESC].  But this argument seems wrong as stated—sim-
ply not issuing a license for someone is very different from enforcing federal immi-
gration law.
41. Matter of Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015).
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include a court order admitting someone to the bar.42  But the Second
Department went further, simply holding that § 1621 was unconstitutional
because it limited states to legislative action.  It held that states could sim-
ply reject the requirement of legislative action and admit noncitizens to
the bar via an order of their courts.  The decision was called “a monumen-
tal one due to the state’s status as a center for the legal profession and its
influence on other state courts regarding bar admission policy.”43  Al-
though the applicant in Vargas was a DACA recipient, the Vargas holding
(that the Benefits Bar can be overridden by courts, not just legislatures)
gives courts the power to admit any noncitizen to the bar, including un-
documented immigrants, if the courts so choose.
Other cases followed the precedent set by Vargas. The Third Depart-
ment of the New York’s Appellate Division adopted Vargas in 2017, admit-
ting an anonymous DACA recipient to the bar.44  Pennsylvania admitted a
DACA recipient to the bar after the applicant’s briefs invoked Vargas.45
And New Jersey admitted the same attorney, Parthiv Patel, despite the
Benefits Bar.46
Vargas made a point of saying that its holding was limited to judicial
orders; it did not hold that state sovereignty allows any state officer to trig-
ger the State-Law Override and authorize public benefits for nonci-
tizens.47  But the New York State Education Department later issued
regulations admitting noncitizens to professional licensure, invoking the
authority embraced by Vargas.48
42. I co-authored and signed the brief for the Attorney General’s office.
Nothing in this article represents the views of the New York Attorney General’s
office or any of the other people whose names appear on the brief.  But I’m deeply
grateful to each of those people for everything I learned from them about the
issues discussed there.
43. Christopher Connell, Undocumented Attorneys and the State of the Bar, 26 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 569, 583 (2017).
44. See Matter of Anonymous, 152 A.D.3d 1046 (2017).
45. See Pennsylvania Admits DACA Recipient to the Bar, ACLU Pennsylvania
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.aclupa.org/news/2017/12/19/pennsylvania-admits-
daca-recipient-bar-1 [https://perma.cc/8BZX-L2P3]; see also Memorandum of Law
in Support of Application of Parthiv Patel (Letter to Pa. Bd. of Law Examiners,
Feb. 21, 2017), available at https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/
3179/1106/ [https://perma.cc/M7F3-RWEW].
46. See DACA Recipient Sworn In As Lawyer By NJ AG, ACLU (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/news/daca-recipient-sworn-lawyer-nj-ag [https://perma.cc/
V46A-V5FU].
47. Matter of Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2015) (“We
emphasize, however, that the Tenth Amendment concerns implicated here by the
issuance of law licenses do not exist in regard to the issuance of other types of
professional licenses by other arms of our state’s government. Our focus here is
solely upon the infringement of the judiciary’s authority, as an independent and
freestanding constitutional branch of state government, to issue law licenses.”).
48. See N.Y. COMP. CODES C.R. & R. 8 § 80-1.3 (2018) (for teacher licensure
“pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), no otherwise qualified alien shall be precluded
from obtaining a professional license under this Title if any individual is not unlaw-
fully present in the United States, including but not limited to applicants granted
10
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It remains to be seen whether other courts or state agencies will simi-
larly find that entities other than state legislatures can invoke the State-
Law Override, and whether other courts will find unconstitutional
§ 1621(d)’s attempt to push decisions about public benefits for nonci-
tizens into state legislatures.
C. A Widespread Practice
The Commerce-in-Arms Act and the Immigration-Benefits Bar are
only two examples of statutes that use preemption to push states to make
decisions through their legislatures.  There are many other statutes that
likewise exempt states from preemption only if they “enact” a “law”—lan-
guage that implies a legislative action.
One example is the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which pro-
hibits discharge of a firearm in a school zone—a statute famously struck
down as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause in
United States v. Lopez, but later amended to cure the defect.49  That Act has
a preemption clause that allows states to create their own gun-free school
zones, but only if they do so by “enacting a statute.”50  Similarly, the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services can exempt states from federal re-
quirements for clinical laboratories if the state enacts a statute that is more
stringent than federal requirements—but apparently not if the state im-
poses more stringent requirements via another part of its government.51
deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals relief or similar relief from deportation.”);
see also id. § 59.4 (applying same language to other professions); 38 N.Y. St. Reg. 19
(March 9, 2016) (proposed regulation); id. 23, 25 (June 1, 2016) (“While the Var-
gas decision is based on an intrusion on the role of the judiciary over bar admis-
sions in violation of the Supremacy Clause, we believe that the Court’s reasoning
applies equally to the adoption of regulations having the force and effect of law by
an administrative agency that is part of the executive branch of New York govern-
ment, another one of the three coequal branches of government under the New
York Constitution.”); Board of Regents Permanently Adopts Regulations to Allow DACA
Recipients to Apply for Teacher Certification and Professional Licenses, N.Y. EDUC. DEP’T,
(May 17, 2016), http://www.nysed.gov/news/2016/board-regents-permanently-
adopts-regulations-allow-daca-recipients-apply-teacher [https://perma.cc/UH7L-
NHCD].  For more on the process leading to these changes, see Janet M. Calvo,
Professional Licensing and Teacher Certification for Non-Citizens: Federalism, Equal Protec-
tion and a State’s Socioeconomic Interests, 8 COL. J. RACE & LAW 33 (2017).
49. The original version of the Act was struck down as exceeding Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
567–68 (1995).  But the Act was later amended to add a jurisdictional element that
cured the constitutional defect; any violation of the Act must now involve “a fire-
arm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.”
18 U.S.C. 922(q)(3)(A), amended by P.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-369, 3009-372
(Sept. 30, 1996).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(4) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as
preempting or preventing a State or local government from enacting a statute estab-
lishing gun free school zones as provided in this subsection.”) (emphasis added).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(p).
11
Ayers: Federalism and the Right to Decide Who Decides
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
578 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: p. 567
And states can enact restrictions on equipment that interferes with wire-
less communications—but only by statute.52
Another example is the Affordable Care Act, which allows states to
opt out of providing abortion coverage through state insurance exchanges
set up under the Act, but only if the state “enacts a law to provide for such
prohibition.”53  Other examples include the federal statute governing the
selection of members of the electoral college;54 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act;55 the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, which cre-
ates procedures for states to request that other jurisdictions detain prison-
ers;56 and laws governing the medical use of narcotic drugs,57 asbestos-
related liability,58 and various other topics.59
52. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(6).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 18023(a)(1).  At least 21 states did so. See Health Reform And
Abortion Coverage In The Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., (Apr. 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-reform-and-abortion-coverage.aspx
[https://perma.cc/W9VN-MKYY].  An analysis of whether this provision forces
states to make decisions through their legislatures would be complicated by the
fact that states are not required to operate their own exchanges.
54. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (“If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the
day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of
such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures . . . such determination . . .
shall be conclusive. . . .”) (emphasis added).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(1)(B)(i) (exempting firefighters who were denied em-
ployment if they were rejected because of “the age of hiring in effect on the date of
such failure or refusal to hire under applicable State or local law enacted after Sep-
tember 30, 1996. . . .”) (emphasis added). See generally Drnek v. City of Chicago,
192 F. Supp. 2d 835, 838 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
56. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. VIII (“This agreement shall enter into full force
and effect as to a party State when such State has enacted the same into law.  A
State party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repeal-
ing the same.”).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(I) (“[N]othing in this paragraph shall be construed
to preempt any State law that . . . permits a qualifying practitioner to dispense
narcotic drugs in schedule III, IV, or V, or combinations of such drugs, for mainte-
nance or detoxification treatment in accordance with this paragraph to a total
number of patients that is more than 30 or less than the total number applicable to
the qualifying practitioner under subparagraph (B)(iii)(II) if a State enacts a law
modifying such total number and the Attorney General is notified by the State of
such modification. . . .”) (emphasis added).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 2650(b) (“[A] State may enact or amend State law to establish or
modify a standard of liability for local educational agencies or asbestos contractors
with respect to actions required under this subchapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2656]”)
(emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(c)(1)(A) (“[A] State, by a State law enacted
by the State legislature prior to the close of such 3-year period, with respect to real
property loans originated in the State by lenders other than national banks, Fed-
eral savings and loan associations, Federal savings banks, and Federal credit un-
ions, may otherwise regulate such contracts. . . .”); see also id. § 2279aa-12(b)(2)
(“The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not be applicable to any State that, during
the 8-year period beginning on January 6, 1988, enacts a law that (A) specifically
refers to this subsection; and (B) expressly provides that paragraph (1) shall not
apply to the State.”) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (“No person using
12
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One of the statutes that shields state legislative action from preemp-
tion, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, was cited with
approval in the Supreme Court’s landmark states’-rights case New York v.
United States.60  That statute provides that the State of Alaska retains cer-
tain authority “if the State enacts and implements laws of general applica-
bility” that meet certain criteria.61  The Supreme Court had no occasion to
discuss this provision of the Act, so New York tells us nothing about the
provision’s constitutionality; nonetheless, it illustrates the number of
places in which we can find examples of Congress using preemption to
push decisions into state legislatures.
Is it safe to assume that the phrase “enact a State law” and its variants
refer to legislative action, as opposed to executive, judicial, or administra-
tive actions?  Dictionaries confirm that the verb “enact” generally refers to
legislative action, rather than executive, judicial or administrative ac-
tions.62  And when Congress wants to allow non-statutory state action, it
does so explicitly, by using language like this:
Nothing herein shall be construed as interfering with such rights as
the States now have either to the waters within their borders or to adopt
such policies and enact such laws as they may deem necessary with respect to
the appropriation, control, and use of waters within their borders, except
the mails, or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, in the exercise
of investment discretion with respect to an account shall be deemed to have acted
unlawfully or to have breached a fiduciary duty under State or Federal law unless
expressly provided to the contrary by a law enacted by the Congress or any State. . . .”)
(emphasis added); id. § 80a-3a(c) (dealing with registration of certain investment
funds: “during the 3-year period beginning on December 8, 1995, a State may en-
act a statute that specifically refers to this section and provides prospectively that
this section shall not preempt the laws of that State referred to in this section.”); id.
§ 6731 (“This subchapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 6731 et seq.] shall only apply to a mutual
insurance company in a State which has not enacted a law which expressly estab-
lishes reasonable terms and conditions for a mutual insurance company domiciled
in such State to reorganize into a mutual holding company.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2345(a)
(“Nothing in this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346] shall be construed to affect the
concurrent jurisdiction of a State or local government to enact and enforce its own
cigarette tax laws, to provide for the confiscation of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco
and other property seized for violation of such laws, and to provide for penalties
for the violation of such laws.”); 47 U.S.C. § 553 (“Nothing in this subchapter [47
U.S.C. §§ 521-573] shall prevent any State or franchising authority from enacting
or enforcing laws, consistent with this section, regarding the unauthorized inter-
ception or reception of any cable service or other communications service.”); 49
U.S.C. § 5904 (allowing states to “enact a law” creating penalties for violation of
state highway-weight laws).
60. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-
3233; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). See generally John
v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013) (detailing how Act works);
Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1988).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d).
62. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “enact” as “[o]f a leg-
islative authority: To make into an act.” Enact, Oxford English Dictionary, http://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/61514?rskey=8kxjq3&result=3&isAdvanced=false#eid
[Permalink unavailable] (last visited Apr. 10, 2018).
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as modified by the Colorado River compact or other interstate
agreement.63
When Congress wishes to do so, it is quite capable of using language
that includes non-legislative actions.  For example, when the federal Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act preempts inconsistent “State law,” it
takes care to define “law” broadly: “ ‘Law’ as used in this section includes
regulations and any enactment which has the force and effect of law and is
issued by a State or any political subdivision of a State.”64  Another statute
likewise provides that “[n]o State or political subdivision thereof may en-
act, prescribe, issue, continue in effect, or enforce any law (including any
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law)” that
transgresses on the relevant areas.65  Similarly, the Airline Deregulation
Act preempts “a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and
effect of law” that applies to the relevant subject matter.66
Another example of congressional tolerance for non-legislative state
action is the federal E-Sign Act, under which e-signatures cannot be de-
nied legal effect in any transaction affecting interstate commerce.67  That
Act preempts any “State statute, regulation, or other rule of law”—note
the care to include non-legislative action.68  It then exempts from preemp-
tion not only state “enactments,” but any state action that “constitutes an
enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.”69
Even though this statute is anticipating the possibility of states adopting
model statutes, it uses the phrase “enactment or adoption,” taking care to
allow for state action other than legislation.  In other words, the law allows
states to adopt a model statute through non-legislative means.  At times,
then, Congress is remarkably protective of states’ non-legislative
lawmaking.
Against this backdrop of congressional care in using the word “enact-
ment,” it seems reasonable to assume that statutes referring to the “enact-
ment” of a state “law” do indeed refer to action by the legislature.  The
question is an important one, because (as noted above) there are many
such statutes.
63. 43 U.S.C. § 618m.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.5(c)(3) (2018).
65. 49 U.S.C. § 44703(j)(2) (requirements for certification of airmen) (em-
phasis added).
66. See id. § 41713(b); see also id. § 14501(c)(1) (similar preemption language
for motor carriers of property); id. § 47107(e)(5) (“This subsection does not pre-
empt—(A) a State or local law, regulation, or policy enacted by the governing
body of an airport owner or operator. . . .”).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1) (emphasis added).
14
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D. Conditional Preemption Without Forced Delegation
The reason for federal laws to save state legislative enactments from
preemption, presumably, is to preserve some measure of state power in
areas otherwise dominated by federal law.  This kind of strategy is known
as “cooperative federalism,” and it is generally looked on with favor by the
courts.70  But most of the statutes that deploy conditional preemption in
the service of cooperative federalism do so without specifying which entity
within state government can take the action that avoids preemption.
For example, the Clean Water Act gives states the power to avoid fed-
eral preemption by developing their own programs for issuing permits to
polluters.71  Rather than requiring that a specific branch of state govern-
ment create the program, the Act requires that the state’s attorney general
certify that state law provides adequate authority for the program.72  Simi-
larly, states can promulgate water-quality standards under the Act if they
submit a certification from “the State Attorney General or other appropri-
ate legal authority within the State that the water quality standards were
duly adopted pursuant to State law.”73  Thus, the federal government re-
mains neutral as to which entity within the state government promulgates
the standards.  Similarly, regulations promulgated under the Clean Water
Act require that states hold public hearings on water-quality standards.74
But those regulations do not specify which entity within state government
must hold the hearings.  Each of these provisions, in short, leaves it to the
state to decide which entity takes the action that avoids federal
preemption.
Indeed, the Clean Water Act contains a provision that saves state
causes of action from preemption and makes clear that it gives equal treat-
ment to judge-made and legislatively created causes of action: “Nothing in
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons)
may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief. . . .”75
70. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
289 (1981) (using term “cooperative federalism” to refer to conditional
preemption).
71. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
72. Id.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 131.6(e).  And the CWA makes no demand that the state adopt
standards via any particular decision-maker: “Each State may develop and submit
to the Administrator a procedure for implementing and enforcing standards of
performance for new sources located in such State.  If the Administrator finds the
State procedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such State any authority he has
under this Act to implement and enforce such standards.”  42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1).
74. 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(a) (“The State shall from time to time, but at least
once every 3 years, hold public hearings for the purpose of reviewing applicable
water quality standards . . . and Federally promulgated water quality standards and,
as appropriate, modifying and adopting standards.”).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).  A related provision states that except where the Act
specifically provides for preemption, nothing in it “shall (1) preclude or deny the
15
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Another major environmental statute, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, likewise allows states to create their own implementation
plans, but imposes no restrictions on which part of state government may
create the plan.76
The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 (OSHA) allows
states to avoid federal preemption by submitting a state plan for the devel-
opment of occupational health and safety standards.77  That plan must
designate a state agency to implement the standards, but nothing in the
statute says which entity within state government must be the source of the
plan, or which agency must be designated by it.78  OSHA also contains a
savings clause that saves from preemption certain kinds of state-law rights,
but that clause, unlike the Commerce-in-Arms Act, specifically preserves
both legislatively enacted and judge-made rights.79  So there are plenty of
ways to do cooperative federalism without forcing decisions into state
legislatures.
E. A Different Problem: Spending Clause Enactments That Push
States to Delegate
Before we examine whether state sovereignty bars Congress from forc-
ing decisions into state legislatures, we should be careful to distinguish two
related practices: pushing decisions into state legislatures by using the pre-
emption power, and pursuing the same goal via the Spending Clause
power.  This Article deals with preemption, and the distinction is
significant.
Many federal statutes condition federal grants on the performance by
states of specific acts, including, in some cases, legislative action.80  When
right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency” to regulate water
pollution.  33 U.S.C. § 1370 (emphasis added).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926; 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.1–271.138 (1991) (detailed require-
ments for state plans).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 667(b).
78. Id. § 667(c).  However, when the federal government makes grants to the
states, OSHA specifies that the governor of the state designates the appropriate
agency to receive the grant. Id. § 672(c).
79. Id. § 653(b)(4) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede
or in any manner affect any workmen’s compensation law or to enlarge or dimin-
ish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabili-
ties of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or
death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.”) (emphasis
added).
80. See 23 U.S.C. § 405(a)(9)(A) (highway-safety grants promoting seat-belt
use); 23 U.S.C. § 163(a), (b) (highway-safety grants helping prevent driving under
the influence); 42 U.S.C. § 653a(a)(1)(B) (directory of new hires to facilitate en-
forcement of child-support obligations); 23 U.S.C. § 154(c) (penalizing states that
don’t have open-container laws); 23 U.S.C. § 158 (exemptions from grant require-
ments related to national minimum drinking age, conditioned on state legislative
action).
By contrast, one grant-making statute allows states to enact a law or promul-
gate a regulation. See 49 U.S.C. § 31141(b) (“A State receiving funds made availa-
16
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a federal statute offers grants with conditions, some part of the state gov-
ernment must decide whether to accept the conditions (and thus the
grants).  A very useful article by Bridget Fahey collects a variety of federal
statutes that designate different ways in which states may consent to the
statutory scheme under which they will receive federal funds.81  For exam-
ple, some statutes require action by the state governor, like the Affordable
Care Act and its implementing guidance, which require the governor to
sign off on the creation of state insurance exchanges.82  Other statutes
require the governor to designate a state agency, which must then take
specified action.83  Yet other federal grantmaking laws designate a state
agency directly, like the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,84 which
designates the “State educational agency.”85  And still others, like the now-
repealed law that established the collaborative federal-state program for
unemployment insurance, required state legislative enactments.86
Fahey offers several powerful arguments against federal laws that des-
ignate specific state officials as the decision-makers responsible for ac-
cepting or rejecting Spending Clause grants.  Such laws interfere with state
autonomy, prevent state officials from effectively representing their con-
stituents and stakeholders, make it easier for the federal government to
expand its power in areas traditionally governed by states, and limit states’
ability to serve as useful dissenting voices in the federal system.87  In this
sense, Spending Clause enactments that empower designated state actors
are similar to conditional-preemption laws like the Commerce-in-Arms Act
ble under [49 U.S.C. § 31104] that enacts a State law or issues a regulation on
commercial motor vehicle safety shall submit a copy of the law or regulation to the
Secretary immediately after the enactment or issuance.”) (emphasis added).
81. Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1561 (2015).
82. Id. at 1573 (discussing Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat
119 (2010)).
83. Id. (discussing Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(2012)).  Fahey particularly discusses § 672, which asks the governor to “designate
the appropriate State agency for receipt of any grant,” then requires the desig-
nated agency to submit an application requesting funds on behalf of the state. See
id. (discussing 29 U.S.C. §§ 672(c)-(d)).
84. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S. Code).
85. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6763(a) (2012)  (state and local technology grants)
(“To be eligible to receive a grant under this subpart, a State educational agency
shall submit to the Secretary, at such time and in such manner as the Secretary
may specify, an application containing a new or updated statewide long-range stra-
tegic educational technology plan (which shall address the educational technology
needs of local educational agencies) and such other information as the Secretary
may reasonably require.”); see Fahey, supra note 81, at 1574 n.48.
86. Workforce Investment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220, § 303, 112 Stat.
936, 1081 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 49c (2012), repealed and replaced by Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 113-128 (2014)). See Fahey, supra
note 81, at 1574.
87. Id. at 1602–19.
17
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and the Immigration-Benefits Bar: they interfere with the same constitu-
tional values, often in very similar ways.
Still, it is important to distinguish the two kinds of statutes.  Fahey
uses the term “consent procedures” to refer to both Spending Clause and
preemption laws that designate specific state actors as decision-makers.88
For example, she (compellingly) criticizes the “consent procedures” cre-
ated by the Immigration-Benefits Bar, a conditional-preemption law, in a
discussion that generally focuses on federal grant conditions.89  The term
“consent procedures” is certainly accurate as a description of Spending
Clause requirements, which take effect only when states give consent.  But
conditional-preemption doctrine doesn’t invoke the concept of state
consent.
The test for the validity of requirements imposed via the Spending
Clause is whether the state in question has validly consented to their impo-
sition; the test for the validity of a preemption provision is simply whether
Congress intended preemption to take place.90  The Immigration-Benefits
Bar allows states to avoid preemption by legislative enactment, but it’s con-
fusing to describe that as a “consent procedure.”
And the substantive values at stake in Spending Clause cases are dif-
ferent from the values at stake in conditional-preemption cases.  True,
grant conditions and conditional preemption can both be used to pres-
sure states to make decisions through a particular actor in state govern-
ment.  But in the grant-condition cases, the result of inaction is foregoing
federal funds.  In preemption cases, the result of inaction is that the fed-
eral government steps in to make policy decisions that would otherwise be
the responsibility of the state government.  It is possible that one of these
federal tactics is unconstitutional and the other is not.
This Article is focused on mapping the reasons why it might be un-
constitutional to push decisions into state legislatures using the preemp-
tion power.  It is useful and important to map the reasons why it might be
unconstitutional to push decisions into state legislatures using the Spend-
ing Clause power, as Fahey’s article does.  But we should keep the two
analyses separate.
88. Id. passim.
89. Id. at 1579, 1604–05, 1610.
90. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012)
(“Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in
accordance with federal policies.  But when pressure turns into compulsion, the
legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.  The Constitution simply does
not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate.”) (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted)); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
137–38 (1990) (“[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by
federal law is one of congressional intent.  The purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss4/1
2018] RIGHT TO DECIDE WHO DECIDES 585
III. THE CASE FOR STATES’ RIGHT TO DECIDE WHO DECIDES
This part of the Article maps out the arguments for the unconstitu-
tionality of federal laws that preempt all state action except legislative en-
actments.  The first three sections argue that such laws amount to
unconstitutional commandeering of state governments.
Section A reviews the anti-commandeering doctrine, and section B
explains why it should be applied to laws that use preemption to push
decisions into state legislatures.  To preempt all state action except legisla-
tion is the functional equivalent of a statute that says “State policy on Issue
X must be determined by the legislative branch of government, and not by
any other branch of the state’s government.”  As argued above, it is as if
there were a state official responsible for choosing which decision-maker
within the state’s government should exercise the power of the sovereign
on any issue, and the federal government commandeered that Delegator
General.  States have important reasons to delegate decisions to one
branch of government rather than another.  When the federal govern-
ment pushes decisions on a given issue into the state legislature, it over-
rides structural arrangements that exist for important substantive reasons.
Decisions about bar admission, for example, are often given to judicial
officials because of their independence and their expertise, and decisions
about tort liability are often left to judges interpreting the common-law
because common-law decision-making is appropriate to the judicial role.
To the extent the concept of sovereignty has meaning, it should include
the power to make such delegations without interference from another
government.
Section C continues the commandeering analysis, explaining why the
accountability concerns that motivate the anti-commandeering doctrine
apply with equal force to laws that use preemption to push decisions into
state legislatures.  When Congress requires state officials to take action,
the public may become confused as to whom should be held accountable.
They may blame the state officials who implement Congress’s require-
ments, while it is really Congress at fault.  This concern should arise even
more powerfully over cases in which Congress takes over states’ decisions
about internal delegation.  What appears to voters to be a state’s failure to
act may in fact be a nearly inevitable result of Congress’s choice about
where to delegate the choice.  But delegation-forcing preemption does an
even better job of concealing the true decision-maker than classic
commandeering.
Section D changes gears, setting aside the anti-commandeering doc-
trine to argue why, as a matter of constitutional policy, the Supreme Court
should offer protection to state choices about who is empowered to de-
cide.  The power to decide who decides is fundamental to a state’s iden-
tity.  If Congress is going to allow states any power to take actions that
avoid preemption, it should not dictate which actor in the state’s govern-
ment has the power to take those actions.
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Finally, Section E invokes a separate line of precedents, in which the
Supreme Court has offered constitutional protection to state decisions
about who is suitable to hold state office.  In allowing states to choose the
office-holder, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of al-
lowing states to decide who decides.
A. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
When Congress uses the preemption power to push a decision into
state legislatures, it does something very similar to the kinds of comman-
deering the Supreme Court has found unconstitutional.  To strike down
the Immigration-Benefits Bar or the Commerce-in-Arms Act on this basis
would be an extension of existing law; the Court has applied the anti-com-
mandeering doctrine to cases in which Congress dictates the substantive
conduct required of state officials, but it has yet to apply the doctrine to
cases in which Congress dictates states’ power-conferring rules.91  To ana-
lyze the case that the anti-commandeering doctrine should be applied to
power-conferring rules, a review of basic principles is in order.
According to the Supreme Court, “the States entered the federal sys-
tem with their sovereignty intact.”92  The Constitution contains explicit
constitutional protections for state sovereignty, like the Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendments, but those provisions do not exhaust the forms of sover-
eignty the states retained when they ratified the Constitution.93  The
Supreme Court has found that various provisions in the Constitution rec-
ognize “residual state sovereignty, from the prohibition on involuntary re-
duction of a state’s territory to the amendments provision and the
Guarantee Clause.94  But provisions like the Tenth Amendment are not
the source of those rights.  The Tenth Amendment is merely “declaratory
of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established by the Constitution before the amendment.”95
Scholars have long criticized the concept of state sovereignty, prefer-
ring other concepts as descriptors of the autonomy that states enjoy within
91. See Fahey, supra note 81, at 1590–94 (distinguishing between “substantive
harms” like costs imposed on states with “procedural harms” like interference in
states’ governing processes).
92. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
93. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
94. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).  Specific recognitions
include the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s
territory, Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the “Citizens” of the States; the
amendment provision, Article V, which requires the votes of three-fourths of the
States to amend the Constitution; and the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, which
“presupposes the continued existence of the states . . . and those means and instru-
mentalities which are the creation of their sovereign and reserved rights.”  Id.
(quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414–15 (1938)).
95. United States v. Darby Lumber, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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our federal system.96  But this discomfort with the idea of sovereignty has
not deterred courts; as Heather Gerken observes, “federalism scholars
(but not the courts) typically treat sovereignty talk as a quaint relic of the
past.”97  This Article aims to show how challenges to statutes like the Im-
migration-Benefits Bar and the Commerce-in-Arms Act might play out in
court; accordingly, it will use the language the courts prefer.
Because of (what courts insist on calling) states’ sovereignty, “the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the abil-
ity to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”98
Congress exercises its regulatory power over individual people—not over
the states.99  One implication of this principle is that Congress cannot
“commandeer” the states—that is, to force them to implement a federal
regulatory program.  Congress has no power to commandeer states’ execu-
tive officials or legislative processes.100
Although the anti-commandeering doctrine was hinted at as early as
the 1970s,101 it was first adopted as the holding of a Supreme Court case
96. Indeed, “sovereignty has been declared ‘dead’ so many times that one
starts to believe in the doctrinal version of reincarnation.”  Heather K. Gerken,
Living Under Someone Else’s Law, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 377, 385 (2016).  Gerken notes
that the tradition dates back at least as far as Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual
Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
97. Id. at 390.
98. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
99. Id. at 166 (“[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers
upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”); see also ACORN v.
Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Such regulation, however, must
operate directly upon the people, and not the States as conduits to the people.”).
100. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (executive officials);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–66 (1992) (legislative processes).
101. The Supreme Court in Printz described an earlier case in which a com-
mandeering issue almost came before the Court:
Federal commandeering of state governments is such a novel phenome-
non that this Court’s first experience with it did not occur until the
1970’s, when the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated regula-
tions requiring States to prescribe auto emissions testing, monitoring and
retrofit programs, and to designate preferential bus and carpool lanes.
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits invalidated the
regulations on statutory grounds in order to avoid what they perceived to
be grave constitutional issues, and the District of Columbia Circuit invali-
dated the regulations on both constitutional and statutory grounds.  After
we granted certiorari to review the statutory and constitutional validity of
the regulations, the Government declined even to defend them, and in-
stead rescinded some and conceded the invalidity of those that remained,
leading us to vacate the opinions below and remand for consideration of
mootness (citations omitted).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.  Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452
U.S. 264, 288 (1981), “did not present the problem they raised because it merely
made compliance with federal standards a precondition to continued state regula-
tion in an otherwise pre-empted field.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 926 (discussing Hodel).
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), “construed the most troubling provisions
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 to contain only the ‘command’
that state agencies ‘consider’ federal standards, and again only as a precondition
21
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in 1992 in New York v. United States, which affirmed that “[t]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.”102
New York struck down a federal statute that forced states to choose
between passing specific legislation and taking title of radioactive waste
generated within their borders.103  Congress lacks the power to compel
states to take title to radioactive waste, which would amount to “a congres-
sionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive waste
producers.”104  Equally impermissible would be “a simple command to
state governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress.”105  Be-
cause the federal law forced states to choose between two constitutionally
impermissible options, and thus effectively “commandeer[ed] the legisla-
tive processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and en-
force a federal regulatory program,” New York struck it down.106
After New York protected states’ legislative processes from comman-
deering, Printz extended that protection to state executive-branch officials.
The federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act required state law
enforcement officials to perform background checks on people who
wanted to buy handguns.107  The Court found unconstitutional “the
forced participation of the States’ executive in the actual administration of
a federal program.”108
Most recently, the Supreme Court applied the anti-commandeering
principle in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association to strike down a
law that made it unlawful for states to “authorize” sports gambling.109 Con-
gress cannot “issue orders directly to the States.”110  According to Murphy,
Congress can no more prohibit specific state enactments than it can re-
quire them.  When Congress prohibits states from authorizing a particular
activity, said the Court, “It is as if federal officers were installed in state
legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators
to continued state regulation of an otherwise pre-empted field.” Printz, 521 U.S. at
926 (discussing FERC). FERC warned that “this Court never has sanctioned explic-
itly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regula-
tions.” FERC, 456 U.S. at 761–62.
102. New York, 505 U.S. at 188; see id. at 161–66 for the principal analysis.
103. Id. at 175.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 175–76.
106. Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).  Congress cannot order the
states to enact a program, the Fifth Circuit later held, even if the federal statute
“affords the States complete discretion to determine the means employed in
achieving [the federal statute’s] goals.” ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1394
(5th Cir. 1996).
107. Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536; see Printz, 521 U.S. at 902.
108. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
109. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018)
(striking down 42 U.S.C. § 3702).
110. Id.
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from voting on any offending proposals.”111  The “basic principle,” said
Murphy, is “that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state
legislatures.”112
Of course, federal statutes of general applicability sometimes apply
directly to state governments.113  But there is no state-sovereignty problem
when a statute “regulate[s] state activities,” rather than “seeking to control
or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties.”114
Thus, South Carolina v. Baker upheld laws that “directly regulated States by
prohibiting outright the issuance of bearer bonds.”115  The rules also ap-
plied to private debt issuers, and even though the states would have to
amend “a substantial number of statutes” to comply, the states were being
regulated qua private parties, not qua sovereigns.116
Likewise, Reno v. Condon upheld a statute that required states to adopt
procedures to protect the confidentiality of drivers’-license informa-
tion.117  That statute, which applied to private parties and state govern-
ments, “does not require the States in their sovereign capacity to regulate
their own citizens,” but rather “regulates the States as the owners of
databases.”118  The states are not only sovereigns, but entities that engage
in market behavior and other conduct analogous to the conduct of private
actors.  Congress is free to regulate them in that capacity, so long as it does
not regulate them in their capacity as lawmakers.119
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Envt’l Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 319 F.3d 398, 413 (9th Cir. 2003),
vacated and superseded on other grounds, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where state
action is incidentally burdened by a federal law of general applicability, the Court
has indicated that the Tenth Amendment may still be implicated if the law ‘exces-
sively interfere[s] with the functioning of state governments’.”) (quoting Printz,
521 U.S. at 932 (“[W]here, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the
functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural frame-
work of dual sovereignty . . . a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate. . . .”)).
114. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000) (quoting South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514–15 (1988)).
115. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 (1988).
116. Id. at 514; see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (ex-
plaining that statute in Baker survived because it simply “subjected a State to the
same legislation applicable to private parties”).
117. Reno, 528 U.S. at 151.
118. Id.
119. Likewise, the First Circuit has found no commandeering problem with a
court injunction that directs state governments to take action to avoid issuing per-
mits that cause the “taking” of an endangered animal in violation of the Endan-
gered Species Act.  Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The statute
not only prohibits the acts of those parties that directly exact the taking, but also
bans those acts of a third party that bring about the acts exacting a taking. We
believe that, contrary to the defendants’ argument on appeal, the district court
properly found that a governmental third party pursuant to whose authority an
actor directly exacts a taking of an endangered species may be deemed to have
violated the provisions of the ESA.”).  An injunction directing the state to come
into compliance with the Endangered Species Act, even though it requires specific
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Relatedly, Congress does not impermissibly commandeer the states
when it uses its preemption power, even when it regulates individuals di-
rectly in an area where states have traditionally been the primary regula-
tors.120  “When Congress passes a law that operates via the Supremacy
Clause to invalidate contrary state laws, it is not telling the states what to
do.”121  By contrast, “using the States as the instruments of federal govern-
ance” is impermissible.122
One of the most important boundaries of the anti-commandeering
doctrine is that it does not prevent the federal government from demand-
ing that states apply federal law in their courts.123  The Supremacy Clause
specifically binds state-court judges to apply federal law, stating that fed-
eral law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”124  In Testa v. Katt, the Supreme
Court held that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law.125 New
York notes that “[f]ederal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a
sense, direct state judges to enforce them, but this sort of federal ‘direc-
tion’ of state judges is mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause.”126
And Printz distinguished state judges from other state officials, making
clear that the power to compel state judges to accept federal law survives
any anti-commandeering analysis.127
The Commerce-in-Arms Act might seem to fall within this carve-out: it
requires state courts to dismiss certain kinds of lawsuits.  Doesn’t the
Supremacy Clause allow Congress to require specific outcomes in state-
court proceedings?  But there is a difference between requiring state
courts to apply federal substantive law and dictating whether state courts
have the power to make state law on a given issue.  All state entities are
required to treat federal law as if it were part of the law of their state;
conduct by state officials, does not violate state sovereignty because it does not
direct the states to enact a federal program; rather, it directs the states to come
into compliance with a federal law of general applicability in the same way any
private actor might be ordered into compliance. Id. at 170.
120. United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1997).
121. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208,
230 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New
Jersey, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, Murphy v. Nat’l Col-
legiate Athletic Assoc., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
122. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).
123. See Tonya M. Gray, Separate but Not Sovereign: Reconciling Federal Comman-
deering of State Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 143, 145–46 (1999).
124. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. See Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Fed-
eral Power to Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism,
32 IND. L. REV. 71, 110 (1998) (discussing the “State Judges Clause,” and arguing
that federal power over state courts in fact derives from other constitutional
sources).
125. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
126. New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
127. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
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requiring state courts to accept federal claims is thus a form of preemp-
tion, not a form of commandeering.
The Testa rule is not really an exception to the anticommandeering
doctrine.128  Requiring state courts to apply federal law is not a case of the
federal government compelling state governments to govern or regulate
in a desired way, because once Congress enacts a substantive rule of law
that validly preempts state law, the federal rule becomes part of the law of
every state.  In other words, the rationale for the Testa rule is that “federal
law is as much the law of the several States as are the laws passed by their
legislatures.”129  State courts that apply federal substantive laws are in fact
applying the law of their own states.
But state courts’ duty to treat federal law as their own law does not
imply federal control over state courts as institutions.  “The general rule,
‘bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judi-
cial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds
them.’”130  This principle should be understood to include taking the
state courts with power to make state law over whatever substantive issues
state law chooses to delegate to them.  “The States . . . have great latitude
to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts.”131  They
should likewise have latitude to establish the kinds of issues over which
state courts have the power to create state law.
Although Congress undoubtedly has the power to preempt state
judge-made substantive rules, the Commerce-in-Arms Act does more than
prescribe rules for state courts to apply.  It takes the power of decision
away from state courts and gives it to another branch of state government.
Congress can preempt state law, but that need not mean Congress can
dictate who makes it.
B. Commandeering States’ Power-Conferring Rules
The reasons Printz gave for striking down the background-check re-
quirement, and the reasons New York gave for striking down the take-title
requirement, are also reasons to strike down statutes that use preemption
to push decisions into state legislatures.
Printz offered a long discussion of constitutional history to show that
the Framers intended to create a federal government that exercises power
128. See Ellen D. Katz, State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After
Seminole Tribe and Printz, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1465, 1504 (1998) (“[T]he contexts
in which federal law may permissibly require state judicial action should not be
understood functionally to constitute compelled administration of federal law
within the meaning of the anti-commandeering rule.”).
129. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734 (2009).
130. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (quoting Henry Hart, The Rela-
tions Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)).
131. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372.
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only over individuals, not over state governments.132  The same concern
applies to federal laws like the Commerce-in-Arms Act and the Immigra-
tion-Benefits Bar.  Those laws effectively regulate state governments di-
rectly, by forcing states to assign specific decisions to a specific branch of
their legislature.  States that would otherwise delegate to their executive or
judicial branches decisions about gun-seller liability or noncitizens’ bene-
fits are forced to reassign those decisions to their legislatures.  Federal laws
like the Commerce-in-Arms Act and the Benefits Bar compel the states to
do otherwise.
Remember the distinction, determinative in the Supreme Court’s
eyes, between a statute that “regulate[s] state activities” and a statute that
“seek[s] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate pri-
vate parties.”133  Statutes that use preemption to push decisions into state
legislatures seek to “control or influence the manner” in which states regu-
late private parties.  Even if these statutes do not absolutely “control” state
regulation, because they do not command it but rather leave the legisla-
ture the choice of not regulating, those statutes certainly seek to “influ-
ence the manner.”
From the perspective of an individual who is affected by the laws in
question, there is little difference between statutes like those struck down
in New York and Printz and statutes like the Commerce-in-Arms Act and the
Immigration-Benefits Bar.  The Brady Act compelled law-enforcement offi-
cials to take actions with which affected people might disagree: perform-
ing background checks before gun sales.  The Commerce-in-Arms Act
requires state judges to take a similarly controversial action: denying negli-
gence claims against gun sellers.  The only difference is the grounds for
the required action: the state judges must deny the claims because only a
different actor in state government is empowered to grant them.  Likewise,
the Immigration-Benefits Bar requires state executive-branch officials to
deny applications for benefits because only a different entity within gov-
ernment (the legislature) has the power to grant those benefits.  But the
state judge or bureaucrat who must make the denial is doing so under
federal coercion, just like the officials who were forced to perform the
background checks in Printz or enact the regulatory program in New York.
True, federal laws like the Commerce-in-Arms Act or the Immigra-
tion-Benefits Bar do not compel state legislatures to enact a specific fed-
eral regulatory program.  Like other conditional-preemption statutes,134
they leave the states the option of taking no action and allowing federal
preemption.  And they do not require any specific behavior from state offi-
132. Id. at 904–22.  For criticism of that analysis, see Wesley J. Campbell, Com-
mandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1107 (2013).
133. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000) (quoting South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514–15 (1988)).
134. See infra Part III, below.
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cials.  But they arguably commandeer an even more fundamental function
of state government.135
We should distinguish between two ways in which Congress can di-
rectly (and thus impermissibly) regulate state governments. One way is to
dictate the rules about what conduct is required of state officials, such as
whether state legislators must pass laws about nuclear-waste disposal, or
whether law-enforcement officers must perform background checks.  An-
other way Congress can commandeer the states is by dictating what H.L.A.
Hart called “secondary rules,” meaning rules about how law is made.136
Hart’s influential book The Concept of Law137 distinguished two kinds
of legal rules: “primary” and “secondary.”  Primary rules dictate which
kind of conduct people can and cannot engage in, like criminal laws that
prohibit specific behavior, or constitutional amendments that protect peo-
ple’s right to express themselves.138  Secondary rules confer or regulate
the power to make primary rules; examples are rules about which con-
tracts are binding, and rules about who can hold a given public office or
which government agency can issue a certain kind of order.139
New York and Printz struck down attempts by Congress to dictate pri-
mary rules.  When Congress told the state legislatures to enact a given reg-
ulatory program, and when it told state law enforcement officers to
conduct background checks, Congress was announcing primary rules that
governed the conduct in which state officials were required to engage.
Statutes like the Commerce-in-Arms Act and the Immigration-Benefits Bar
do not dictate primary rules; instead, they dictate secondary rules—rules
conferring power on specific decision-makers within state government.
So the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine covers
cases in which Congress dictates state governments’ power-conferring
rules.  The best way to analyze this question is to look to the policy con-
135. It might seem that forcing state legislatures to decide a given issue is not
as coercive as forcing them to enact a specific program.  But it could be argued
that commandeering a state’s power-conferring functions is more intrusive than
simply dictating the behavior required of state officials.
136. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 95–96 (2d ed. 1994).
137. Id.; see John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of Commercial
Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 119, 123 (2009).
138. HART, supra note 136, at 95–96.
139. Id.; see Frederick Schauer, (Re)taking Hart: A Life of H.L.A., 119 HARV. L.
REV. 852, 870 (2006) (reviewing NICOLA LACEY, HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE
NOBLE DREAM (2004)) (“Among these [secondary rules] are the rules of change,
which specify how the stock of primary rules may be increased and how primary
rules may be eliminated or modified. And there are also rules of adjudication,
which determine how disputes about the application of primary rules of conduct
will be resolved. But most fundamental among the secondary rules are the rules of
recognition, which enable citizens and officials to ascertain what the rules of law
are, and thus to understand, for example, why the prohibition on insider trading
in section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a rule of law while the moral
prohibition on being nasty to your elderly mother is not.).
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cerns that the Court invoked in explaining the anti-commandeering
doctrine.
C. The Threat to Accountability
One problem with commandeering, according to the Supreme Court,
is that it hides the true decision-makers from the voters to whom those
decision-makers are supposed to be accountable.140  Voters cannot hold
policymakers accountable unless they understand clearly who is responsi-
ble for the policies in question.
This justification has come under fire from both empirical and theo-
retical perspectives.141  As Andrew Coan writes, “it is difficult to think of a
more frequently and persuasively criticized element of the Court’s mod-
ern federalism jurisprudence.”142  The theory behind the accountability
argument is that commandeering hides the true decision-maker, confus-
ing voters about whether the federal government or the state and local
authorities are responsible for the policies voters may care about.  But this
argument seems to discredit all federal-state cooperation.143  When Con-
gress acts under its Spending Clause authority to incentivize state action,
for example, voters may be confused, but Spending Clause laws are well-
accepted.144
In fact, the accountability argument “seems to condemn not merely
federal laws that commandeer state or local services but also even volun-
tary intergovernmental cooperation.”145  Imagine the FBI and the local
police show up on your doorstep together.  They may have simply run into
each other on the sidewalk outside, but how can the voter tell who is re-
sponsible for what looks like a joint government action?  As long as two
governments are working together, the accountability concern will be
present.
And the empirical assumptions underlying the Court’s concern for
accountability are also highly questionable.146  Political scientists have
found that voters often do not know which officials endorse policies that
140. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992); Murphy, 138 S.
Ct. at 1477.
141. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federal-
ism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and ‘Dual Sovereignty’ Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV.
813, 825–26 (1998).
142. Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of Ameri-
can Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2015).
143. See Hills, supra note 141, at 826.
144. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Accountability and Mandates: Redefining the Problem
of Federal Spending Conditions, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 482 (1995).
145. Hills, supra note 141, at 826.
146. See Evan H. Caminker, Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Comman-
deer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1061–67 (1995);
see also Coan, supra note 142, at 15.
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match the voters’ preferences.147  In fact, voters often do not know their
own preferences; they express dramatically different policy preferences de-
pending on how questions are framed, and show remarkable inconsistency
over time.148
Nor do voters hold politicians accountable for policy decisions in any
way that tracks real-world causality.  While voters do not seem to impose
any reliable reward for good economic performance, for example, they do
impose a stiff penalty on presidents for uncontrollable misfortunes that
occur during a president’s tenure, like shark attacks, even where the offi-
cial in question had no control over the response to those incidents.149
These problems are particularly acute in state and local elections, where
voters often make choices based on their understanding of federal politics,
rather than any assessment of the policies or performance of state and
local officials.150
So accountability may be, in the real world, a hopelessly unrealistic
goal.  But perhaps that makes it all the more important to prohibit con-
gressional maneuvers that confuse the electorate.  Then again, it can also
be argued that commandeering doesn’t really threaten accountability at
all.  Neil Siegel points out that if a voter is able to sort out which level of
government is responsible for government regulations in general, they
may well be able to sort out who is responsible for commandeering.151
We will have to bury these eminently reasonable concerns to assess
the likelihood that the Immigration-Benefits Bar, the Commerce-in-Arms
Act, and similar laws might be successfully challenged in court.  The Su-
preme Court has wholeheartedly endorsed a concern for democratic ac-
countability as a key justification for the anti-commandeering doctrine, so
that concern should at least be considered in our analysis of where the
anti-commandeering doctrine applies and how it might be extended.
When the federal government exercises its preemption power in the
traditional way, the Supreme Court tells us, there is no question about who
is responsible for the resulting policy outcomes.  “[I]t is the Federal Gov-
ernment that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be
federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be
detrimental or unpopular.”152  The situation is different when Congress
commandeers state government.  “[W]here the Federal Government di-
rects the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt
of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory
147. CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS:
WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 36–49 (2016).
148. Id. at 30–34.
149. Id. at 126–127; 175–77.
150. See David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763
(2017) (discussing the implications of “second-order elections” for federalism).
151. Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective,
59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2006).
152. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
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program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision.”153
The idea here is that voters may hold accountable the last policymak-
ers to take action.  Voters, apparently, are capable of identifying the policy-
makers who enact a regulatory program, but not capable of understanding
that they did so because the federal government ordered them to.  Put
differently, there is a significant risk of voter misunderstanding when the
state legislature takes an action under federal command.  Voters will see
the headline, “State Legislature Enacts Program X,” but will not read far
enough to find out why.
In the case of executive-branch commandeering, this risk is easier to
imagine.  When Congress orders state officials to conduct background
checks, “it will be the [state official] and not some federal official who
stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his
gun.”154  In effect, Congress positions the states to bear the political conse-
quences of Congress’s choices.  The fear is that commandeering pushes
apparent responsibility onto state officials, while the real responsibility for
the policy remains with Congress.
The same concern applies when Congress pushes a decision into state
legislatures.  Consider the Commerce-in-Arms Act.  Voters may be frus-
trated that gun-sellers in their state cannot be held liable when their negli-
gence in selling weapons causes the deaths of innocent victims.  Whom
should they hold responsible for this state of affairs?  Before the Com-
merce-in-Arms Act, voters might have held accountable members of the
legislative or (if the state has elected judges) the judicial branch, either of
whom had power to hold gun-sellers liable. But now the situation is con-
fused.  If the judiciary has traditionally set standards in this area, knowl-
edgeable voters will be primed to hold their elected judges responsible.
But Congress has now taken that power away from them. New York and
Printz tell us that this is too confusing for voters.
Or consider the Immigration-Benefits Bar.  Imagine that voters in a
given state may be frustrated that undocumented immigrants are denied
public benefits.  (Perhaps this seems politically unlikely in our current cli-
mate,155 but structural concerns like anti-commandeering should open
channels of accountability for all voters, no matter how typical their views.)
Traditionally, perhaps, decisions about which noncitizens receive state
benefits may lie with a different branch.  This was the case in Vargas, in
which it was elected members of the judiciary who traditionally made deci-
sions about noncitizens’ eligibility for bar admission.  But Congress took
that power away from them, reserving it solely for the state legislature.  If
153. Id.
154. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
155. Perhaps it is easier to imagine the opposite. See generally MARISA
ABRAJANO & ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, WHITE BACKLASH: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND AMERI-
CAN POLITICS (2015).
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the application in Vargas had been denied, who should voters hold respon-
sible? New York and Printz tell us that voters are likely to be confused.  The
policy with which they disagree (the denial of benefits) appears to ema-
nate from the entity within state government that denies the benefits, but
in fact the federal government has ordered that entity to deny them—not
on substantive grounds, but on the grounds that only a different entity
within state government can deny the benefits.
Although accountability was the main reason for concern about com-
mandeering, there are others.156  For example, there is the concern that
commandeering makes it too easy for Congress to regulate, which will
cause too much of whatever regulation is eased.157  There is a similar con-
cern here: Congress makes it unduly easy to deny benefits to undocu-
mented immigrants by assigning that decision to state legislatures.  The
concern in Printz was about resources—Congress can do background
checks without paying for them.158  In the legislative context, the re-
sources required are smaller in scale, but floor time in any legislature is a
significant resource, and avoiding the floor time and informal work neces-
sary to achieve consensus on a denial of benefits makes it much easier to
effect that denial.
Another concern is temptation. New York warns us that arrangements
like these may be very appealing to both federal and state officials who
want to avoid accountability for their decisions.  For example, a federal
official may well prefer that states decide where radioactive waste is to be
sent.159  But state officials, if they lack political courage, may prefer that
Congress order them to make a certain choice, so that they can later try to
blame the results on Congress.160  Thus, along with the risk that voters will
mistakenly direct their ire at state officials, the availability of comman-
deering creates a risk that state officials will be relieved of the duty to do
their jobs.  “The interests of public officials thus may not coincide with the
Constitution’s intergovernmental allocation of authority.  Where state offi-
156. Another concern was too much federal power over states. “The power of
the Federal Government would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to im-
press into its service—and at no cost to itself—the police officers of the 50 States.”
Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. But this can hardly be a required element of the comman-
deering analysis, since it is not present in New York’s facts—commandeering of
state legislatures involves no undue augmentation of federal enforcement
resources.
Another concern in Printz was separation of powers within the federal govern-
ment.  If Congress could use state officials to execute its laws, it would no longer
need to rely on the U.S. president to do so, a dangerous imbalance. Printz, 521
U.S. at 922–23.
157. See Siegel, supra note 151, at 1644 (“As law and economics posits, actors
that do not internalize the full costs of their behavior tend to engage in too much
of the behavior.”).
158. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
159. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182–83 (1992).
160. Id. at 193.
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cials purport to submit to the direction of Congress in this manner, feder-
alism is hardly being advanced.”161
For scholars who think the accountability concerns expressed in Printz
and New York are bogus, there are more palatable ways of formulating the
argument.  Coan, for example, argues that the problem with comman-
deering is not that it confuses voters, but that it “threaten[s] the indepen-
dent relation of state governments to their electoral constituencies.”162  A
state government that acts under commandeering—or under the kind of
Spending Clause coercion rejected in NFIB—acts at the behest of a na-
tional electoral constituency, rather than its own.163  The problem, in
other words, isn’t that voters will mistakenly blame or praise the state gov-
ernment for a federally mandated program; the problem is that the state
government is no longer working for its constituents, but for the constitu-
ency of the federal government.164
This constituency-based concern is just as present when Congress ex-
ercises undue influence over states’ delegation function.  If a proposal to
grant public benefits to noncitizens stalls out in a given state’s dysfunc-
tional legislature, rather than sailing smoothly through an executive
agency, voters may or may not know who to blame.  But regardless of what
voters perceive, that procedural decision should be made by officials who
have a principal–agent relationship with the people of the state, not offi-
cials who act on behalf of the entire country.
In short, the concerns motivating the anti-commandeering doctrine
also militate against allowing Congress to require that a decision be made
by state legislatures on pain of preemption.  As the next two sections will
explain, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not the only reason to pre-
vent Congress from using its preemption power to push decisions into
state legislatures.
D. The Delegation Power is Fundamental to State Sovereignty
In addition to the anti-commandeering rationales discussed above, at
least two significant arguments militate against delegation-forcing preemp-
tion.  Both of them are, loosely speaking, policy arguments, but they are
grounded in policies that are well-recognized in constitutional precedent.
First, the states’ internal-delegation power is worthy of protection because
it is so fundamental to the states’ identity as sovereign or autonomous gov-
ernments.  Section E, below, will pursue a second point: that the states’
power to assign decisions to specific offices is analogous to their constitu-
tionally protected power to choose the officials who will occupy decision-
making offices.
161. Id. at 183.
162. Coan, supra note 142, at 18.
163. Id. at 23–24.
164. Id.
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1. Delegations Happen for a Reason
Delegation-forcing preemption interferes with states’ ability to choose
their own decision-makers.  This ability is not merely procedural.  Policies
about who decides are chosen for substantive and significant reasons.  Dif-
ferent branches of government serve different purposes, and the archi-
tects of state government have important reasons for assigning a given
decision to one branch or another.
Consider the diversity of possible delegations on any given issue.
States reserve some questions for their legislatures, while other decisions
are assigned to the executive branch (which in some cases means assign-
ment to an independent agency, or an executive official elected separately
from the governor).165  Other questions, like the interpretation of stat-
utes, are left to the courts.  Still other issues are addressed by constitu-
tional amendment, referendum, delegation to local governments, or other
non-legislative processes.
These decisions are made for reasons that are worth caring about.
Indeed, entire bodies of law have evolved to govern the choices states
make about delegation.  These power-conferring rules are among the
most important subjects taught in law school: in constitutional law, separa-
tion-of-powers rules to decide which branch of government handles a
given question; in administrative law, anti-delegation principles and doc-
trines of deference that identify the circumstances in which agencies may
decide certain questions; in civil procedure, doctrines of justiciability to
decide when the judiciary may handle a certain question; and in constitu-
tional law, constitutional rights that place certain questions forever be-
yond the power of any government agency to resolve.  Different states
evolve very different versions of these doctrines.166
Some decisions are better suited than others to certain kinds of gov-
ernmental decision-makers.  If sovereignty means in part the state’s power
to design and control its own governmental structure, then the assignment
of decisions to specific decision-makers is an important part of that
sovereignty.
Consider, for example, the Immigration-Benefits Bar, which forces
states to deny public benefits to various groups of noncitizens unless the
state legislature says otherwise.167  By preventing states from assigning de-
cisions about immigrants’ benefits to other branches of government, the
Benefits Bar interferes with significant state interests.  The judicial branch
traditionally determines who should be admitted to practice as an attor-
ney, because judges are plausibly thought well-suited to make judgments
about the qualities that attorneys should have.  But the Benefits Bar pro-
165. New Jersey is the only state in which there are no elected executive-
branch officials other than the governor. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 17 (1998).
166. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 16 n.40 (1998).
167. 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2018).
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hibits the state judiciary from making such decisions when the applicants
are certain kinds of noncitizens.  The Benefits Bar thus overrules the
state’s substantive judgment about which entity within state government is
best suited to determine the suitability of candidates for bar admission.
The Supreme Court has long taken care to avoid any suggestion that
the federal government has a say in how states allocate power within their
government. “Indeed, the federal government cannot even dictate
whether a state must respect a separation of powers within its
government.”168
Constitutionally speaking, internal delegations are none of the fed-
eral government’s business.  In 1902, the Court rejected an argument that
Illinois violated due process by delegating legislative responsibilities to a
parole board, holding that questions of internal state delegation were mat-
ters for the state government alone to determine:
Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a state shall
be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections
of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters,
exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of
government, is for the determination of the state.169
Similarly, in 1937, the Court rejected a claim that Virginia violated the
U.S. Constitution when its legislature delegated power over milk markets
to a milk commission.170  The United States Constitution, the Court ex-
plained, has no application to questions about how a state chooses to dele-
gate state-governmental powers.171  Again, the language went beyond due
process to broadly endorse states’ freedom to structure their internal dis-
tribution of powers in whatever way they chose.  Justice Cardozo wrote,
“[h]ow power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental or-
gans is commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself.”172
In 1957, the Supreme Court held that a state attorney general’s inves-
tigation of “subversive” activities violated due process, but took care to
make clear that its holding was not grounded in any concerns about sepa-
ration of powers.173  Justice Frankfurter, concurring, wrote that “[i]t
would make the deepest inroads upon our federal system for this Court
now to hold that it can determine the appropriate distribution of powers
and their delegation within the . . . States.”174
168. Brief of Appellant at 49, Delana v. CED Sales, Inc., 486 S.W.3d 316 (Mo.
2016) (No. SC95013) (quoting Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902)).
169. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
170. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (plurality opinion)
(“[T]he concept of separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitu-
tion is not mandatory in state governments.”).
174. Id. at 256 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (cited approvingly in Minnesota,
449 U.S. at 461 n.6).
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The Supreme Court, then, has recognized that the federal govern-
ment should avoid telling states how to delegate their decision-making au-
thority.  This principle, when added to the anti-commandeering doctrine
and the policies behind it, amounts to a strong case against delegation-
forcing preemption.
2. How Far Could This Go?
To see how troubling delegation-forcing preemption is, we should
look at how far it might go.  The Immigration-Benefits Bar would override
not only a state’s decision to delegate bar admission questions to its judici-
ary, but also other judgments about how to delegate within state govern-
ment.  It would apparently override a state’s decision to hold a ballot
referendum on the question of public benefits for noncitizens—as indeed
California did in 1994 with Proposition 187, the famous “Save Our State”
initiative that would have denied various benefits to undocumented immi-
grants if it had not been struck down on preemption grounds.175
Of course, opponents of Proposition 187, or of ballot initiatives more
generally, might celebrate that particular outcome.  But other modes of
lawmaking would be equally impermissible.  Depending on a state’s pro-
cess for constitutional amendment, the Immigration-Benefits Bar might
well prohibit a state from enshrining protections for noncitizens in its con-
stitution, because a constitutional amendment (particularly in states that
amend their constitutions primarily through popular initiatives) is argua-
bly not a legislative enactment.176
Indeed, there are more than hypothetical questions about whether
the Immigration-Benefits Bar prevents a state from giving benefits to
noncitizens via its constitution, rather than a statute.  New York State’s
constitution guarantees a right to “[t]he aid, care and support of the
needy,”177 and this right prohibits state agencies from denying welfare
Whether the state legislature should operate largely by committees, as
does the Congress, or whether committees should be the exception, as is
true of the House of Commons, whether the legislature should have two
chambers or only one, as in Nebraska, whether the State’s chief executive
should have the pardoning power, whether the State’s judicial branch
must provide trial by jury, are all matters beyond the reviewing powers of
this Court.
Id.
175. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755
(C.D. Cal. 1995), on reconsideration in part, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
176. See TARR, supra note 165, at 25–27 (1998) (describing state processes for
constitutional amendment and the extent to which legislatures and popular refer-
enda are involved in those processes).  For an example of a state giving constitu-
tional protection to noncitizens via a judicial interpretation of the state’s equal-
protection clause, see Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001).
177. N.Y. CONST. art. 17, § 1 (“The aid, care and support of the needy are
public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions,
and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time
determine.”).
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benefits on the basis of any “eligibility condition having nothing to do with
need.”178  In other words, it is unconstitutional to deny state welfare bene-
fits to someone because of their immigration status.179  The Benefits Bar,
by its terms, could be seen to preempt this state constitutional provision
because it is not a statute.180  It is difficult to imagine any legitimate fed-
eral purpose that could be served by giving effect to state statutes, but not
state constitutions.
And if Congress has the power to limit states to legislative enactment,
it seems natural to think it could limit states to other modes of lawmaking.
Imagine, then, a federal law that preempted all state laws and policies un-
less they were created by popular referendum.  This would be a remarka-
bly intrusive law, even though it allowed the state the option to do
nothing.  If a state’s residents cared deeply about the issue, the federal law
would refocus public debate in that state onto the question of whether to
hold a referendum.  But that procedural question is necessarily one about
the workings of the state government: are referenda a good way to make
policy?  Do they unduly infringe the responsibilities of the legislature?
The resulting public debate and its outcome might well have long-lasting
impacts on the state’s internal political processes by causing referenda to
become more or less popular, or by aligning one political party with or
against the effort to hold a referendum.
Aside from the substantive reasons to assign a decision to one branch
rather than another, there are reasons to allow multiple branches a say in
the decision.  Actions by state courts often prompt action by state legisla-
tures, and vice versa, as witnessed in the pre-Obergefell state proceedings
dealing with same-sex marriage.181  Action by a single branch can prompt
a useful conversation within a state, which delegation-forcing preemption
would interrupt or even prevent.
And if these prospects aren’t troubling, we can invent even more in-
trusive scenarios: say, a federal law that says all state action is preempted
except for executive orders issued by governors who are within one year of
running for re-election.  Or imagine a federal law that says states can only
enact a certain policy if the legislature of every county in the state votes to
approve it.  Or imagine that states can only pass a given law if their state
comptroller certifies it—a particularly intrusive requirement, given that
178. Aliessa v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 429 (2001).
179. Id.
180. Even if the state constitution were a statute, the Benefits Bar would still
refuse to give it effect because it was enacted before 1996. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)
(“A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States
is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise
be ineligible under subsection (a) only through the enactment of a State law after
August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility.”) (emphasis
added).
181. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596–97 (2015) (discussing
state proceedings and debates).
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only fourteen states have comptrollers.182  Again, if Congress can use its
preemption power to specify the entity within state government that has
power to decide, it is hard to see why we shouldn’t allow Congress to make
such specifications with highly intrusive specificity.183
All of these possibilities are contrary to the spirit of the federal Consti-
tution, which allows states significant flexibility in the way they adapt their
form of government to the policymaking challenges they see.  To be sure,
there are limits; as Deborah Jones Merritt writes, “[n]o state may establish
a monarchy, a dictatorship, or any other form of government inconsistent
with popular representation.”184  But within those limits, some scholars
say, the Guarantee Clause185 restricts the federal government’s ability to
dictate any limits on how states shape their governments.186
Whether because of the Guarantee Clause or simply because of a tra-
dition of respecting states’ sovereignty, there is significant variation in the
way states structure their government.  While most states have bicameral
legislatures, Nebraska’s is unicameral, and at the time of the Constitution
three of the thirteen colonies had unicameral legislatures.187  And many
states have periodically debated switching to a unicameral model.188
These hypotheticals show that although the accountability concerns
raised in New York and Printz must be taken seriously, delegation-forcing
preemption raises an additional concern not present in those cases.  The
federal laws in those cases did not override states’ judgments about which
decision-maker was best suited to resolve a given issue.  This, ultimately, is
the most convincing reason to regard delegation-forcing preemption as
unconstitutional.
182. See Controller (state executive office), BALLOTPEDIA, https://bal-
lotpedia.org/Controller [https://perma.cc/PBE2-MAZH] (last visited Apr. 19,
2018).
183. Fahey offers a wonderful reductio ad absurdum for Spending Clause condi-
tions: what if the federal government designated Bridget Fahey as the person re-
sponsible for deciding whether her state should consent to the federal scheme?
Fahey, supra note 81, at 1595–96.  Of course, this might be thought troubling be-
cause it is arbitrary to empower a private citizen to consent on behalf of a govern-
ment with which she is unaffiliated.  But Fahey’s hypothetical provokes us to
imagine others in which Congress designates a random state employee, by name,
as the person who must decide whether the state will accept federal funding (or,
for purposes of this article, the person who decides whether the state will take the
action that avoids federal preemption).
184. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federal-
ism for A Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1988).
185. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
186. See Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (sug-
gesting that the Guarantee Clause “embodie[d]” the “wisdom of allowing the states
themselves to decide whether, and when, to fill interim vacancies” in their legisla-
tures); see also Merritt, supra note 184, at 25.
187. Jonathan S. Ross, A New Answer for an Old Question: Should Alaska Once
Again Consider A Unicameral Legislature?, 27 ALASKA L. REV. 257, 272 (2010).
188. Id. at 272–73.
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The decision whether to make state policy by legislative enactment is
no less substantive, and no less potentially fraught, than decisions about
whether to make state policy by popular referendum.  If we are troubled
by the prospect of a federal law that preempts all state policy not made by
referendum, we should also be troubled by a federal law that preempts all
state policy not made by statute.  State courts take action, which prompts
state legislatures to take action, and vice versa, within and between
states.189  When all non-legislative action is preempted, the state’s deliber-
ative processes suffer, because this intra-governmental dialogue is dis-
rupted.  The bad effects of delegation-forcing preemption, in other words,
are more than the sum of its parts.
E. The Power to Choose State Officials
A final reason to treat delegation-forcing preemption as unconstitu-
tional is that the Supreme Court has long given special consideration to
the states’ interest in choosing their own officeholders.  Of course, delega-
tion-forcing preemption involves the federal government channeling deci-
sions to a specific office, not a specific officeholder.  But the choice of
which office should be assigned a given decision, and which human being
should be sitting in the office when the decision arrives in its mailbox, are
closely related.  Both involve the power to decide who decides.
The separation of state and federal sovereignty extends to their office-
holders.  As the Supreme Court has said, “[t]he positions occupied by
state officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government’s most detailed
organizational chart.”190  The Court has protected states’ power to choose
their own officeholders in a variety of ways.
In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court allowed Missouri to enforce a
mandatory-retirement rule for state-court judges, despite the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act.191 Gregory refused to conclude that the Act
applied to state judges without a sufficiently “plain statement” of Con-
gress’s intent to do so. It cited the principle that “if Congress intends to
alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.’”192  Applying the federal statute to state
judges would alter the constitutional balance because the selection of state
officers is so fundamental to the state’s identity as a sovereign.  A decision
about who holds office is “a decision of the most fundamental sort for a
sovereign entity.  Through the structure of its government, and the char-
acter of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a
189. I’m grateful to Patricia Reyhan for observations along these lines.
190. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
191. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991); see Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 2-15, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), amended
by 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1974).
192. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61 (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan-
lon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
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sovereign.”193  Thus, Gregory strongly endorsed “the authority of the peo-
ple of the States to determine the qualifications of their most important
government officials,” which it said “lies at the heart of representative
government.”194
Gregory invoked another line of cases implicating state sovereignty: the
Equal Protection cases in which state governments barred noncitizens
from employment in certain sovereignty-related jobs.  Strict scrutiny ap-
plies to most state laws affecting aliens, but the Court makes an exception
for state rules about who can hold important state governmental office or
serve in other positions performing functions that are important to state
sovereignty.195  These “sovereign-function” cases exempt from strict scru-
tiny a state’s decisions about eligibility for such positions, because those
decisions are “intimately related to the process of democratic self-
government.”196
Gregory found these cases helpful in analyzing a challenge under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act to Missouri’s mandatory-retire-
ment laws for judges, because both issues implicated “the States’ constitu-
tional power to establish the qualifications for those who would
govern.”197  The state has just as compelling an interest in deciding which
state officials are empowered to make a given decision as it does in decid-
ing who is eligible to be a state official.
Into this mix of protections for state office-holders we might add the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, which protects the independence of the
officials who act on states’ behalf.  The Supreme Court has taken care to
circumscribe the extent to which state officials are subject to suit, partly
because of concerns about the integrity of state government.  Since “a
State can only perform its functions through its officers, a restraint upon
them is a restraint upon its sovereignty. . . .”198  As with the anti-comman-
deering rule, the principle of sovereign immunity is grounded in “struc-
tural” principles rather than specific passages in the Constitution: “[W]e
have understood the Eleventh Amendment to confirm the structural un-
derstanding that States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity
intact, unlimited by Article III’s jurisdictional grant.”199
193. Id. at 460.  The Court cited Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570–71
(1900) (“It is obviously essential to the independence of the states, and to their
peace and tranquility, that their power to prescribe the qualifications of their own
officers . . . should be exclusive and free from external interference, except so far
as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.”) and Boyd v. Nebraska
ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892) (“Each State has the power to prescribe the
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen . . . .”).
194. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452, 463 (internal quotations omitted).
195. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
196. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
197. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
198. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999).
199. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011).
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In short, the power to decide who decides is fundamental.  If we add
together the anti-commandeering doctrine, the fundamental importance
of the states’ internal-delegation power, the threat to accountability posed
by delegation-forcing preemption, and the Supreme Court’s protection of
states’ power to choose their own officeholders, we have a powerful case
for the unconstitutionality of statutes that use preemption to push deci-
sions into state legislatures.200
IV. THE THREE BEST DEFENSES OF DELEGATION-FORCING PREEMPTION
This Article has, so far, focused on arguing the unconstitutionality of
statutes that push states to make decisions via their legislatures on pain of
preemption.  But there is a formidable argument that nothing is wrong
with such statutes.  They do not simply direct the states to make decisions
via their legislatures; rather, they offer states a choice between doing so
and being preempted altogether.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly ap-
proved this kind of conditional preemption, and closely related forms of
what it calls “cooperative federalism.”
The simple answer is that while cooperative federalism, including
conditional preemption, is in general constitutional, the specific kind of
conditional preemption that drives decisions into state legislatures is not.
To see how this can be so, this section of the Article will review the general
principles the Supreme Court has applied in approving various forms of
conditional preemption and other kinds of cooperative federalism.  None
of those principles require endorsing delegation-forcing preemption.
A. But the Supreme Court Loves Cooperative Federalism
We should begin with a review of cooperative federalism and why the
Supreme Court has generally endorsed it.  Conditional preemption is one
kind of cooperative federalism.201  The other kind is Spending Clause leg-
islation, in which states that accept federal funds agree to regulate in cer-
tain ways.202  Both involve inducing states to act, rather than compelling
200. What remedy would be appropriate if a constitutional challenge to dele-
gation-forcing preemption succeeded?  If the Immigration-Benefits Bar unconsti-
tutionally limits the power to avoid preemption to the state legislature, is the
remedy to allow other actors to avoid preemption, or to extend preemption abso-
lutely?  Since the test for preemption is Congressional intent, it seems wrong to
completely deny states the opportunity to avoid preemption—Congress did, after
all, intend to allow them some such opportunity.  And courts could avoid these
problems by construing phrases like “enactment of a State law” to include action
by other government bodies.  But it is easy to imagine these issues becoming the
subject of litigation.
201. See Stewart, 563 U.S. at 253.  For an overview of cooperative federalism,
and the cases that have upheld it, see Philip J. Weiser, Towards A Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668–77 (2001).
202. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (Congress may “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States.”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (under Con-
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them to do so.  The reason for calling these laws “cooperative federalism”
is that they involve “a shared federal and state government responsibility
for standard setting, funding, and enforcement.”203
Meaningful choice is key to cooperative federalism’s appeal. New York
said: “[W]e have recognized Congress’ power to offer States the choice of
regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law
pre-empted by federal regulation.”204  Conditional preemption and
Spending Clause conditions are acceptable because “the residents of the
State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will com-
ply.”205  Thus, “[i]f a State’s citizens view federal policy as sufficiently con-
trary to local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant.”206  The
key is that Congress is merely incentivizing, not compelling, state decision-
making.  “Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than com-
pelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s
preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.”207  So in
general, the Supreme Court has found conditional preemption acceptable
because the state retains a meaningful choice about whether to comply
with the conditions.
It could be argued that the Supreme Court’s approval of conditional
preemption swallows any argument against delegation-forcing preemp-
tion, but to this there is a ready answer.  As the next section explains,
things that are generally appropriate may be impermissible in certain
circumstances.
B. But the Greater Includes the Lesser
The simplest argument in favor of delegation-forcing preemption is
that greater powers include lesser powers.  If Congress can preempt all
state action in a certain field, it should be able to preempt all non-legisla-
tive state action in that field.208  If total preemption is permissible, so
should conditional preemption.
This is a classic argument.  Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “[e]ven
in the law the whole generally includes its parts.  If the State may prohibit,
it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain
way.”209  As Michael Herz has observed, it is also a dangerously misleading
gress’s spending power, “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds . . .”).
203. John D. Edgcomb, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental
Protection: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 TUL. L. REV.
299, 299 (1983).
204. New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
205. Id. at 168.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. This is only “a precondition to continued state regulation of an other-
wise pre-empted field . . . .”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997).
209. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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one.210  “[S]odium chloride is a harmless substance (table salt).  But that
does not mean that either sodium or chlorine is harmless; because of their
interaction the components do not necessarily share the characteristics of
the whole, and vice versa.”211
Thus, in the context of laws that apply to individual people, an entire
body of jurisprudence has arisen to determine when it is unconstitutional
to impose conditions on the receipt of government benefits.212  The Su-
preme Court has recognized that “even though a person has no ‘right’ to a
valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny
him the benefit for any number of reasons . . . [the government] may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests . . . .”213  The same principle should apply to federal
laws that affect the states.  And indeed it does: in the Spending Clause
context, where the federal government is generally free to spend money in
ways that promote the general welfare, the government nonetheless must
not condition federal expenditures in ways that violate independent con-
stitutional prohibitions.214
In the preemption context, it is similarly misleading to say that the
existence of a general preemption power makes any use of conditional
preemption acceptable.  For example, it would surely be unacceptable for
the federal government to say, “state actions are preempted unless all rele-
210. Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument That the Greater Includes
the Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 243 (1994).
211. Id.; see also Thomas Wm. Mayo, Abortion and Speech: A Comment, 46 SMU
L. REV. 309, 313 (1992) (referring to “the greater power includes the lesser power”
as a “semi-mystical aphorism”).
212. See Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Ques-
tions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61 (2013); Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Ir-
relevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 480 (2012); Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of
Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1185 (1990); Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Op-
tional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme
Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). See generally
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
For specific application in the land-use context, see Brian T. Hodges, Are Critical
Area Buffers Unconstitutional? Demystifying the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 8
SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2018); Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions After Lingle: How Basing
Nollan and Dolan on the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Limits Their Scope, 28
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577, 578 (2009).  For an attempt to generally solve the problem
of why threats (including conditions on government benefits) are sometimes per-
missible and sometimes not, see Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats Versus Uncontrived
Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 503, 544 (2016).
213. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see also Jonathan Rom-
berg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the Unconstitutional Condi-
tions Doctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051, 1053 (1995).
214. See Lawrence Cty. v. Lead–Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40–1, 469 U.S. 256,
269–70 (1985).
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vant decision-makers are more than six feet tall.”  The argument against
delegation-by-conditional-preemption has the same structure: it is im-
proper to say, “you can grant benefits only if you accept federal interfer-
ence with your sovereign right to delegate decisions within your state
government.”
The preemption power must be exercised in a way that does not vio-
late independent constitutional limitations.  Now we are back to the ques-
tion of whether such an independent limitation exists here, and if so,
whether it has been violated.  On this point, some pre-New York cases pose
a significant challenge.
C. But the Supreme Court Has Upheld Statutes That Push Decisions
Into State Legislatures
Any challenge to delegation-forcing preemption would have to over-
come the precedent established in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Association,215 a 1981 case that upheld a statute much like the ones
this article criticizes.
1. Hodel and the Legislative-Action Requirement
Hodel upheld a federal law under which states could assume regula-
tory authority over coal-mining only if they enacted certain environmental
standards via their state legislature.216 Hodel found this permissible be-
cause the states could choose to allow federal preemption, rather than
enact the federal standards.  “If a State does not wish to submit a proposed
permanent program that complies with the Act and implementing regula-
tions, the full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government.
Thus, there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.”217  The case was cited with approval in Printz
and New York for the proposition that federal laws are permissible when
they “merely ma[k]e compliance with federal standards a precondition to
continued state regulation in an otherwise pre-empted field.”218
The federal law in Hodel, then, did precisely what the Immigration-
Benefits Bar and the Commerce-in-Arms Act do.  It used conditional pre-
emption to push decisions into state legislatures.  But the question the
215. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
216. See id. at 271 (“The proposed program must demonstrate that the state
legislature has enacted laws implementing the environmental protection standards
established by the Act . . .”).
217. Id. at 288.
218. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997) (citing Hodel, 452 U.S.
at 288); see also New York v. United States, 50 U.S. 144, 173–74 (1992) (“Where
federal regulation of private activity is within the scope of the Commerce Clause,
we have recognized the ability of Congress to offer States the choice of regulating
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by fed-
eral regulation.”) (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
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Court addressed in Hodel was whether Congress could use its preemption
power to pressure states to regulate in general.  The issue was whether
Congress could pressure states to act, not whether it could limit the power
to act to state legislatures.  The Court said not a word about the permissi-
bility of channeling decisions into state legislatures. So it would be inaccu-
rate to cite Hodel for the proposition that delegation-forcing preemption is
constitutional.219
2. New York and the Spending Clause
Another precedent that might be cited in defense of delegation-forc-
ing preemption is the Spending Clause analysis in New York  v. United States
itself, which upheld a practice that is similar to delegation-forcing preemp-
tion.  The case dealt with challenges to three separate statutory provisions
(one of which was the commandeering provision discussed above), each of
them designed to encourage states to arrange for the disposal of nuclear
waste generated within their borders.220
One of the statutory provisions challenged in New York allowed the
payment of money to states that adopted certain pieces of legislation.221
As discussed above, this is not unusual; there are more than a few federal
219. The same argument applies to another pre-New York case that might be
cited in defense of delegation-forcing preemption. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982), upheld a federal law that required states to con-
sider certain factors in their regulatory decision-making, on pain of federal pre-
emption.  “In FERC, we construed the most troubling provisions of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, to contain only the ‘command’ that state
agencies ‘consider’ federal standards, and again only as a precondition to contin-
ued state regulation of an otherwise pre-empted field.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 926.
This statute arguably intrudes into states’ internal decision-making procedures just
as much as forced delegation; it sets part of the agenda for state rulemakers.
Nonetheless, the Court upheld the statute because it didn’t compel the states to do
anything; it was merely a condition on which the states could avoid otherwise-per-
missible federal preemption. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161; see also Ponca Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1433 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, judgment
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Oklahoma v. Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma, 517 U.S.
1129 (1996) (“If New York teaches that the Tenth Amendment prohibits a federal
directive that requires the states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program,
FERC instructs that Congress may require the states to consider, but not necessarily
adopt, a federal program.”).
But, again, the Court did not consider any argument about states’ control over
their own decision-making procedures.  So FERC does not endorse Congress’s
power to choose which branch of a state government Congress wishes to handle a
given decision.
220. New York, 505 U.S. at 152.  The states were compelled to either join an
interstate compact or create disposal sites within their own borders. Id. at 151–52.
221. Basically, states that had disposal sites collected fees, and transferred a
portion of those fees into an escrow account, which was then paid out to states that
adopted specific legislation.  “By July 1, 1986, each State was to have ratified legisla-
tion either joining a regional compact or indicating an intent to develop a disposal
facility within the State.” New York, 505 U.S. at 152 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2021e(d)(B)(i), (e)(1)(A)).
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statutes on the books that similarly condition federal spending on the pas-
sage of state legislation.222
The Supreme Court upheld the provision at issue in New York.223  It
applied the four requirements for a valid Spending Clause enactment,224
and found each one satisfied: the expenditure was “for the general wel-
fare”; the conditions the states had to meet were unambiguous; the condi-
tions were “reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure”; and
they did not violate any independent constitutional prohibition.225
Thus, a defender of delegation-forcing preemption could argue that
the Supreme Court endorsed something indistinguishable in New York.
Conditional preemption and Spending Clause incentives are the two clas-
sic forms of cooperative federalism.  If Congress can encourage states to
delegate to their legislatures via the Spending Clause, why not via
preemption?
To this argument there is a ready answer—in fact, two of them.  First,
New York did not approve the use of the Spending Clause to push decisions
into state legislatures.  The Supreme Court in New York was not presented
with an argument that there was anything wrong with conditioning a fed-
eral expenditure on passage of state legislation.  And it thus failed to con-
sider whether the provision at issue violated an “independent
constitutional prohibition” like the various protections for state sover-
eignty discussed above.226
Alternatively, challengers might argue that the Spending Clause and
preemption are different.  Spending Clause incentives are less coercive
than the threat of preemption.  If the state declines Spending Clause
money, it loses money.  To be sure, losing money can be bad for a state;
but NFIB made clear that the Court will not allow Congress to use the
Spending Clause to inflict coercive Spending Clause penalties on states.227
When the threatened denial of spending goes beyond a “financial induce-
ment” and becomes “a gun to the head,” the Spending Clause power is
exceeded and the federal law is struck down.228  Thus, Spending Clause
incentives cannot amount to much more than the threat of losing money.
222. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 405(a)(9)(A) (highway-safety grants promoting seat-
belt use); 23 U.S.C. § 163(a)–(b) (highway-safety grants helping prevent driving
under the influence); 42 U.S.C. § 653a(a)(1)(B) (directory of new hires to facili-
tate enforcement of child-support obligations); 23 U.S.C. § 154(c) (penalizing
states that don’t have open-container laws); 23 U.S.C. § 158 (exemptions from
grant requirements related to national minimum drinking age, conditioned on
state legislative action).
223. New York, 505 U.S. at 171–73.
224. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).
225. New York, 505 U.S. at 171–72.
226. For more on independent constitutional prohibitions and challenges to
Spending Clause enactments, see Lawrence Cty. v. Lead–Deadwood Sch. Dist. No.
40–1, 469 U.S. 256, 269–70 (1985).
227. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–82 (2012).
228. Id.
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Conditional preemption is different.  If a state declines to pass legisla-
tion that overrides the Immigration-Benefits Bar, then noncitizens within
the state are forced to go without professional licenses, cash assistance,
and other public benefits.  Likewise, if the states decline to pass legislation
holding gun sellers liable for negligence, then under the Commerce-in-
Arms Act the victims of gun sellers’ negligence will lose their cases in
court.  The alternative to state legislative action in conditional-preemption
cases, in other words, is the acceptance of a federal regulatory scheme that
imposes policy outcomes with which state officials or state voters may vehe-
mently disagree.  This is more intrusive, or at the very least differently in-
trusive, than a simple denial of money, because in the preemption
context, states can’t step out of the field.
D. States Can’t Step Out of the Field
Cases like Hodel and New York, when they endorse Congress’s power to
pressure states to regulate, assume that states have a meaningful choice in
the matter.  The states in those cases could have chosen to forego federal
funds or allow federal preemption.  But the matter of state choice is a
sliding scale: the more pressure Congress exerts, the less meaningful the
states’ choice.  This is why NFIB limited the amount of federal funds Con-
gress can threaten to take away: at a certain point of pressure, free choices
are no longer really free.229
The same thing is true with conditional preemption: free choices are
no longer really free, because state legislatures are only hypothetically em-
powered to take no action.  In reality, doing nothing is a substantive
choice—it is regulating by inaction.  Statutes like the Immigration-Benefits
Bar do not allow the state legislature to step out of the regulatory field in a
meaningful way.  If conditional spending can become the equivalent of
commandeering—as NFIB makes clear it can230—then so too can condi-
tional preemption.
Allowing federal preemption is a substantive policy choice of great
consequence.  Once the decision whether to allow federal preemption is
given to the state legislature, and only the state legislature, state legislators
should reasonably expect to be held accountable for it.  As Fahey observes,
“acts of omission can be just as inconsistent with the will of the state electo-
rate as acts of commission.”231  Once federal law designates a single state
actor as the decision-maker, that actor’s inaction becomes the sole cause
of the substantive policy outcome—even if the inaction is attributable to
229. Id.  Samuel Bagenstos interprets NFIB as holding that “[w]hen Congress
takes an entrenched federal program that provides large sums to the states and
tells states that they can continue to participate in that program only if they also
agree to participate in a separate and independent program, the condition is un-
constitutionally coercive.”  Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and
the Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 866 (2013).
230. See Coan, supra note 142, at 16.
231. Fahey, supra note 81, at 1608.
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unrelated factors, like the state legislature being too busy or out of
session.232
Take, for example, the Commerce-in-Arms Act, which preempts state-
law civil claims against gun sellers unless the state legislature authorizes
such claims.233  State legislators can choose to take no action—to pass no
statute creating liability for gun sellers.  If the legislators take no action,
federal preemption applies, and there is no liability for negligent gun sell-
ers.  This is not a neutral outcome.
State legislatures that take no action help create a state of affairs in
which gun sellers cannot be sued even if their negligence causes death or
serious injury.  While the state legislatures did not alone create this state of
affairs (the federal government is arguably more responsible), no other
entity within state government had the power to change it.  The decision
has been forced into the state legislature in the sense that only the state
legislature has the power to avoid federal preemption or, by defaulting,
allow it.  Forcing one branch of the state government to take responsibility
for a politically sensitive decision, when the state might prefer other
branches handle it, is not cooperative federalism.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY IT MATTERS WHO DECIDES
This article has argued that states have a sovereign right to decide
who decides.  Congress acts unconstitutionally when it tries to use condi-
tional preemption to push decisions into state legislatures.
If true, or even plausible, this argument has important implications in
three realms: public policy, a realm in which states have become newly
activist in challenging federal policy under the Trump administration; le-
gal doctrine, particularly case law dealing with states’ rights; and legal the-
ory, particularly scholarly accounts of federalism.
First, in the realm of policy, the establishment of a state’s right to de-
cide who decides would represent an important tool for states that want to
resist federal policy on issues like immigration and gun control.  While
states have long been active in making policy in areas like immigration,234
progressive states in particular have become newly energized and active in
the aftermath of Donald Trump’s inauguration—not just in making their
own laws, but in resisting the federal government’s agenda on issues in-
232. Some state legislatures work part-time and have small staffs. See Full- And
Part-Time Legislatures, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 14,
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-
legislatures.aspx#average [https://perma.cc/DHN5-LBPC].  And some legisla-
tures meet for only brief periods; Wyoming’s legislature, for example, met for less
than two months in 2017. See 2017 Legislative Session Calendar, NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/
ncsl/2017sessioncalendar.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU4U-TK8U].
233. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902(a)–(b), 7903(5)(A) (2018).
234. See generally PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN,
THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015).
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cluding immigration and firearms.235  These, of course, are two of the ar-
eas in which Congress has attempted to use delegation-forcing
preemption to push decisions into state legislatures.
The Immigration-Benefits Bar and the Commerce-in-Arms Act have
major impacts on immigration and gun policy; they deny welfare benefits
and many other benefits to large groups of noncitizens, including some of
the most vulnerable, and protect negligent gun sellers from liability.  A
legal theory that allows states to challenge those laws successfully has the
potential to make a major impact on national policy.  And, as the discus-
sion above showed, those are just two of the examples of statutes that are
potentially vulnerable to such challenges.
Second, in the realm of legal doctrine, the idea of a state’s right to
decide who decides would become a significant part of the rising tide of
new protections for state sovereignty.  These new protections have come in
a variety of areas, including the Spending Clause context discussed above,
where the Supreme Court for the first time gave substance to the anti-
coercion doctrine in NFIB v. Sebelius.236  And Shelby County v. Holder found
sections of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional because they require
states to “beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement
laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on
their own.”237  Again, the concern here is for the integrity of states’ deci-
sion-making procedures—the same value that is threatened by the kind of
delegation-forcing preemption described in this article.
In each case, scholarly work provides a structure for the Court to go
even further in protecting state sovereignty if it chooses to do so.  Scholars
have been skeptical of conditional preemption,238 too, and of the whole
idea of cooperative federalism.239  And Fahey’s work provides a sound the-
oretical foundation for the recognition of a state right to decide which
state actor can consent to federal grant conditions on the state’s behalf.240
This article has shown, I hope, that there is more than adequate reason for
the Supreme Court to add to these state-sovereignty protections a prohibi-
tion of conditional-preemption statutes that infringe states’ right to decide
235. See Laura Krantz and Jim O’Sullivan, Blue-State Attorneys General Lead
Trump Resistance, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
metro/massachusetts/2017/02/06/state-ags-lead-charge-against-trump/LCHc5C
QrZMzV1JUd4c027M/story.html [https://perma.cc/U3V9-4396?type=image]; see
also Steve Peoples, Dem Attorneys General Unite Against Concealed-Carry Gun Law, AP
NEWS (Oct. 23, 2017 8:48 AM), https://apnews.com/2b9ed600c9f14f8d876b2f36
d08c0106 [https://perma.cc/5WZM-S3GG].
236. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574–83 (2012).
237. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S 529, 544 (2013).
238. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federal-
ism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 104; Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267,
426–27 (1998).
239. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557,
559 (2000).
240. Fahey, supra note 81.
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who decides.  Whether the courts will walk down this road is another ques-
tion; but if they do, it is adequately paved.
Third, this Article’s argument about the unconstitutionality of delega-
tion-forcing preemption is relevant to the ongoing scholarly conversation
about how federalism works and what values it serves.241  Scholars have
developed many models of the relationship between our federal and state
governments, with some stressing the separateness of the federal and state
governments, and others stressing the cooperative relationships between
the two.242  Others argue that the two roles go together: that “the state’s
status as servant, insider, and ally might enable it to be a sometime dis-
senter, rival, and challenger.”243  States contribute to national political de-
bates by airing competing views244 and by giving opportunities to people
and groups who do not control the levers of federal power.245
The federal laws described in this article illustrate how the interaction
between state and federal power can be politically fraught, as well as conse-
quential, when federal power and state power interact in novel ways.  The
Immigration-Benefits Bar has provoked states to assert themselves, either
by going ahead with state legislation that satisfies its requirement (as in the
case of California) or by insisting on the state’s right to decide who de-
cides despite what the Benefits Bar appears to require (as in the case of
New York).246
These debates have the potential not just to serve as examples of the
dynamics that federalism theorists have observed, but to add an important
insight to their observations: that when “cooperative federalism” statutes
plunge states into disputes with the federal government, what is at stake in
those disputes is not just the substantive policies in question, but the struc-
241. See id. at 1892–93 (“[F]ederalism can be a tool for improving national
politics, strengthening a national polity, bettering national policymaking, en-
trenching national norms, consolidating national policies, and increasing national
power.”); see generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Over-
view, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1891 (2014) (“Supporters of conventional federalism have
a ready list of reasons why states matter. Federalism promotes choice, fosters com-
petition, facilitates participation, enables experimentation, and wards off a na-
tional Leviathan.”).
242. See generally Hills, supra note 141, at 815–16; Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federal-
ism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011).
243. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009).
244. See Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institu-
tional and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2014).
245. See Gerken, supra note 241, at 1898 (“Decentralization, then, gives de-
mocracy’s outliers the same opportunities that members of the majority routinely
enjoy. It gives dissenters the ability to speak truth with power, not just to it.”).
246. Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President and
Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101, 148 (2016) (“This Section describes two
instances in which federal executive decisions under President Obama spurred
state-level lawmaking. In the first instance, the DOJ intervened in a California state
court lawsuit in a manner that influenced state legislation on professional licensing
for unauthorized migrants.”).
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ture of government itself.  What is at stake in these conflicts is not just
immigrants’ rights, or relief for victims of gun violence, but also the shape
and integrity of state governments across the nation.
There is no such thing as a Delegator General.  But the job descrip-
tion that would go along with such a position—”chooses which part of
state government will handle every decision, big and small”—matches a
very real function of every sovereign government. Given current boiling
controversies over states’ rights, and the eagerness and creativity with
which activist state governments are now reaching for every available tool
to challenge federal government policies, there is every reason to think
that we will soon see more intense and widespread controversies over
states’ right to decide who decides.
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